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'I'm Dying to Tell You What Happened':
The Admissibility of Testimonial Dying
Declarations Post-Crawford
by PETER NICOLAS*

Introduction
Imagine the following scenario: David is shot in the chest by
Paula and believes that he is dying. The paramedics arrive, and
David says to them, "Before I die... I need to tell you ... that Paula
shot me... You... also ... should ...know.., that... Brenda...
robbed... First National Bank... last... month." As it turns out,
David survives, and Paula and Brenda are indicted, respectively, for
attempted murder and bank robbery in separate state court
proceedings in Utah. Although David is alive, prosecutors are not
able to secure his testimony, either because he refuses to testify or
simply cannot be found by prosecutors. Accordingly, they offer the
paramedics' testimony about what David said under Utah's hearsay
exception for dying declarations, which provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(b)(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a civil or
criminal action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant
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Professors Robert Aronson, Tom Cobb, Thomas Y. Davies, David A. Moran, Michael
Polelle, Aviva Orenstein, Eilleen Scallen, and Kathryn Watts for their extremely helpful
comments.
[487]

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 37:3

while believing that the declarant's death was imminent, if the
judge finds it was made in good faith.1
The defense objects on Confrontation Clause grounds, but the
prosecution contends that the paramedics' testimony falls within the
"dying declaration exception" to the Confrontation Clause. How
should the court rule?
The answer to this question requires
resolution of a key issue left open by the U.S. Supreme Court that has
just begun to attract the attention of the lower courts: is there a
"dying declaration" exception to the command of the Confrontation
Clause, and if so, what is its scope?
There has always been an uneasy tension between the
admissibility of dying declarations (and, more generally, hearsay
evidence) and the seeming command of the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 2 and
analogous provisions in state constitutions that the accused be given
the right to confront the witnesses testifying against him. When first
asked to resolve the tension between the dying declaration exception
and the Confrontation Clause at the end of the nineteenth century,
the United States Supreme Court, in Mattox v. United States,3 brushed
it to one side, reasoning as follows:
Many of [the Constitution's] provisions in the nature of a bill of
rights are subject to exceptions, recognized long before the
adoption of the constitution, and not interfering at all with its
spirit.
Such exceptions were obviously intended to be
respected.
A technical adherence to the letter of a
constitutional provision may occasionally be carried further
than is necessary to the just protection of the accused, and
further than the safety of the public will warrant. For instance,
there could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of
the provision in question than the admission of dying
declarations. They are rarely made in the presence of the
accused; they are made without any opportunity for
examination or cross-examination, nor is the witness brought
face to face with the jury; yet from time immemorial they have
1. See UTAH R. EVID. 804(b)(2). Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, as under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and those of most states, a declarant is deemed "unavailable" if
she, inter alia, refuses to testify or is absent from the hearing and cannot be procured by
the proponent by process or other reasonable means. See UTAH R. EVID. 804(a)(2),
(a)(5); FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(2), (a)(5).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him").
3. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
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been treated as competent testimony, and no one would have
the hardihood at this day to question their admissibility.4
Decisions issued by state high courts both prior and subsequent
to Mattox came to the same conclusion when asked to address the
issue on state constitutional grounds

4. Id. at 243-44.
5. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Slavski, 140 N.E. 465, 467-68 (Mass. 1923); State v.
Saunders, 12 P. 441, 442-43 (Or. 1886) ("The rule, although sanctioned by constitutional
declaration, like all general rules, has its exceptions. . . . The admission of dying
declarations has uniformly been held to be one of the exceptions; and it would be folly for
this court to attempt to overthrow the numerous decisions to that effect."); State v. Oliver,
7 Del. (2 Houst.) 585 (1863) ("The provision of the constitution referred to, was not
designed and was never understood to exclude such dying declarations as were admissible,
and which were admissible even in our own courts long before any constitution was
framed and adopted in the State, and have been ever since."); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431,
438 (1858) (The court held that to exclude dying declarations "would not only be contrary
to all the precedents in England and here, acquiesced in long since the adoption of these
constitutional provisions, but it would be abhorrent to that sense of justice and regard for
individual security and public safety which its exclusion in some cases would inevitably set
at naught. But dying declarations, made under certain circumstances, were admissible at
common law, and that common law was not repudiated by our constitution in the clause
referred to, but adopted and cherished."); People v. Glenn, 10 Cal. 32 (1858) ("[T]his
exception to the general rule of testimony has been too firmly established to be
overthrown. There would be the most lamentable failure of justice, in many cases, where
the dying declarations of the victims of crime excluded from the jury."); Anthony v. State,
19 Tenn. (Meigs) 265, 277 (1838) ("[W]e are all of opinion that the Bill of Rights can not
be construed to prevent declarations properly made in articulomortis, from being given in
evidence against defendants in cases of homicide."). Some decisions took a slightly
different approach, declaring instead that, for purposes of the constitutional confrontation
guarantee, the "witness" against the accused is not the declarant whose dying declaration
is admitted, but rather the witness who testifies to what the deceased said. See Robbins v.
State, 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857) ("The deceased person is not the witness, but the person who
can relate, on the trial, the death-bed declarations, is the witness."); Walston v.
Commonwealth, 55 Ky. (16 B. Mon.) 15 (1855) ("The person who testifies to the dying
declaration is the witness against the accused."); State v. Price, 6 La. Ann. 691 (1851)
(Preston, J.) ("When the dying victim ceases to exist, he is no longer a witness, and cannot
be confronted with the accused; but his dying declarations remain as evidence, and the
accused is only entitled to be confronted with the witnesses to those declarations.");
Woodsides v. State, 3 Miss. (2 Howard) 655, 665 (1837) ("The argument proceeded upon
the supposition that the deceased party was the witness, and as he could not be confronted
or cross-examined by the prisoner, it was a violation of the prisoner's rights... If he were,
or could be a witness, his declaration, upon the clearest principle, would be inadmissible....
It is the individual who swears to the statements of the deceased that is the witness, not the
deceased."). However, such an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause of the U.S.
Constitution has been rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004) ("Accordingly, we once again reject the view that the
Confrontation Clause applies of its own force only to in-court testimony, and that its
application to out-of-court statements introduced at trial depends upon 'the law of
Evidence for the time being."').
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Finally, in 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court provided its first
theoretical (as opposed to ad hoc) justification for admitting at least
some hearsay evidence against the accused in a criminal case despite
the command of the Confrontation Clause. In Ohio v. Roberts,6 the

Court reasoned that hearsay evidence may be admitted when the
declarant is unavailable and the hearsay statement at issue is
"reliable" in that it either falls within a "firmly rooted" exception to
the hearsay rule or contains "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."7 The Court later softened the requirement that the
declarant must always be unavailable.8 In Roberts, the U.S. Supreme

Court identified dying declarations as the sort of hearsay that
qualified as falling within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception,9 a
category of exceptions that appeared to be tied to longevity and
widespread acceptance."
But the Roberts approach was relatively short-lived; in 2004, the

U.S. Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington" and its progeny
completely overhauled its theory of the relationship between hearsay
evidence and the Confrontation Clause.

No longer could the

prosecution circumvent the plain language of the Confrontation

6. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
7. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
8. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986) ("Roberts cannot fairly be
read to stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court statement can be introduced
by the government without a showing that the declarant is unavailable."). Indeed, Roberts
itself pulled away from this requirement as soon as it stated it. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65
n.7 ("A demonstration of unavailability, however, is not always required.").
9. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
10. See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 130 (1999) (relying on the fact that a
particular application of the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule is "of
quite recent vintage" to conclude that it is not "firmly rooted"); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S.
346, 355 n.8 (1992) (relying on the fact that the hearsay exception for spontaneous
declarations is over two centuries old and recognized in eighty percent of the states, and
the fact that the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis
and treatment is widely accepted among the states to conclude that both are firmly
rooted); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (relying on the fact that the
co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule was first recognized by the Court 150 years
earlier to conclude that it is firmly rooted); Coy v. Renico, 414 F. Supp. 2d 744, 770 (E.D.
Mich. 2006) (holding that the phrase refers to hearsay exceptions that have "long-standing
and widespread use"); Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 616 (Del. 2001) (noting that the
finding that a hearsay exception is firmly rooted "depends in part on the longevity and
widespread acceptance of the hearsay exception by courts and legislatures."); State v.
Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, 1089 (N.M. 1996) ("[A] court should consider the exception's
historical longevity and widespread acceptance to determine whether the exception is
'firmly rooted."').
11. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Clause merely by showing that a hearsay statement was trustworthy,
either based on a "particularized" showing of reliability or by virtue
of the hearsay statement falling within a "firmly rooted" exception.
Instead, the Court held that the touchstone is whether the statement
at issue is "testimonial" or "non-testimonial:"' 2 If the statement at
issue is non-testimonial, the Confrontation Clause presents no barrier
to admissibility. 3 But if the statement is testimonial, it is inadmissible
unless (a) the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine her; (b) the declarant appears as a
witness at trial and can be cross-examined about the statement at
issue; or (c) the statement is offered into evidence for some reason
other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 4
Thus, on the surface, Crawford eviscerated the U.S. Supreme
Court's prior holding that hearsay was admissible if it fell within a
firmly rooted exception. But a footnote in Crawford tethers to the
holding an apparent exception for the firmly rooted dying declaration
exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, despite the Crawford Court's
efforts to create a clean test for admissibility that is tied to the text of
the Confrontation Clause, the Crawford Court, like its predecessors,
did not have the "hardihood" to question the admissibility of dying
declarations. Accordingly, buried in footnote six of the opinion are
the roots of an exception to the new rule announced in Crawford for
dying declarations, even if they are testimonial:
The one deviation we have found involves dying declarations.
The existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal
hearsay law cannot be disputed.
Although many dying
declarations may not be testimonial, there is authority for
admitting even those that clearly are. We need not decide in
this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an
exception for testimonial dying declarations. If this exception
must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.15
In footnote six, the Court took pains to point out that Crawford
did not technically decide the issue of the admissibility of dying
declarations vis-A-vis the Confrontation Clause. But if the postCrawford era to date is any guide, this dictum will, like other dicta in
12. See id. at 68.
13. See Whorton v. Bocking, 549 U.S. 406, 419-20 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547
U.S. 813, 824-25 (2006).
14. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 59 & n.9.
15. Id. at 56 n.6.
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After all, the

Crawford Court also did not decide whether non-testimonial hearsay
would continue to be subject to Confrontation Clause analysis, but it
quickly converted its Crawford dictum'7 on that issue into a holding.'8
Likewise, its strong hints in Crawford9 and its subsequent decision in
Davis v. Washington2 about using the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing

exception as a means of circumventing the Confrontation Clause have
likewise found their way into subsequent holdings. 1 In any event, the
Court's holding in Giles v. California22 four years later effectively
assumes that a dying declaration exception to the Confrontation
Clause exists. 3 Moreover, lower federal courts and state courts that

have addressed the issue have, with near unanimity, read footnote six
of Crawford as creating a dying declaration exception to the
Confrontation Clause. 4
Accordingly, the purpose of this Article is not to question
whether there is a sound basis for recognizing a sui generis dying
declaration exception to the Confrontation Clause-others have done
a thorough job of considering that issue,25 and in any event the answer
to that question seems inevitable. Rather, this Article assumes that

16. Indeed, as a general matter, Supreme Court dicta can serve as a valuable
predictor of future holdings. See Evan Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward
Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking,73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 18 (1994) ("[D]icta
lack precedential status but can form the basis for predicting the Supreme Court's position
on the issue addressed."); Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37
Hous. L. REV. 1395, 1420 (2000) ("[A]lthough dicta does not bind the Supreme Court, it
can be the most reliable prediction of the Court's likely disposition of an issue.").
17. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
18. See Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419-20; Davis,547 U.S. at 824-25.
19. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
20. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832-33.
21. See Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2683-93 (2008).
22. Id.
23. See id. at 2684-86.
24. See, e.g., People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956, 972 (Cal. 2004); Walton v. State, 603
S.E.2d 263, 265-266 (Ga. 2004); People v. Gilmore, 828 N.E.2d 293, 302 (Ill. 2005);
Wallace v. State, 836 N.E.2d 985, 993-96 (Ind. 2005); State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815, 821-22
(Kan. 2008); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 310-11 (Mass. 2008); People v.
Taylor, 737 N.W.2d 790, 794-95 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578,
585-86 (Minn. 2005); Harkins v. State, 143 P.3d 706, 710-11 (Nev. 2006); State v. Calhoun,
657 S.E.2d 424, 426-28 (N.C. 2008); State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136, 147-48 (Tenn. 2007).
But see United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964-65 (S.D. Ohio 2005); United
States v. Jordan, 2005 WL 513501, at *3-*4 (D. Colo. 2005).
25. See, e.g., Michael J. Polelle, The Death of Dying Declarationsin a Post-Crawford
World, 71 MO. L. REV. 285 (2006).
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dying declarations constitute an exception to the Confrontation
Clause, and proceeds to ask a critical question that neither Crawford
nor the decisions that have followed it have answered and that
virtually none have even raised: How does one define the phrase
"dying declarations" as a constitutionalmatter?
Stated somewhat differently, it seems clear enough thatassuming a dying declaration exception to the Confrontation Clause
exists-the U.S. Supreme Court would not permit a state or the
federal government to circumvent the Confrontation Clause by
defining their hearsay exceptions for "dying declarations" broadly to
include any and all out-of-court statement made by a declarant (in
other words, an exception that truly swallows the rule). Although
such an extreme example may seem fanciful, it is nonetheless true
that there is a great deal of divergence amongst the states and the
federal government with respect to how they define the scope of their
dying declaration exceptions to their rules against hearsay. For
example, some versions of the dying declaration exception extant in
the United States today can be invoked only if the declarant actually
dies,26 while other versions can be invoked whenever the declarant is
"unavailable."27 Similarly, some versions allow for the admission of
dying declarations only in homicide cases in which the declarant's
death (and not someone else's) is the subject of the charge," while
others allow for their admission in civil as well as other types of
criminal cases. 9 Furthermore, some limit the scope of the exception
to statements concerning the cause or circumstances of the declarant's
death (or what he believed to be his death)," while others impose no
such limit.3'
32

The question that thus arises is whether there is a static
definition of "dying declarations" as a constitutional matter, and if so,

26. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(e) (2008); People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109,
113 & n.3 (1986).
27. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); IOWA R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
28. See, e.g., CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 8-6(2); People v. Murawski, 117 N.E.2d 88, 9091 (1954); Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109, 113 & n.3.
29. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 804(b)(2); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.804(2)(b) (2005).
30. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); MICH. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
31. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(e); UTAH R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
32. By the term "static," I mean a definition that is grounded in the Constitution and
is constant over time (subject, of course, to constitutional amendment or re-interpretation
by the courts) and thus that does not "depend[] on the law of Evidence for the time
being." Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting 5
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what is that definition? Although it was not necessary for the Court
in Crawford to address that issue in its footnote six dictum, the Court
(and lower courts) likely will have to address that issue when they
consider the admissibility of dying declarations in future cases
involving broad versions of the dying declaration exception, such as in
the scenario presented in the opening hypothetical.
This Article demonstrates the existence and delineates the scope
of a federal constitutional definition of "dying declarations" that is
distinct from the definitions set forth in the Federal Rules of
This Article further
Evidence and their state counterparts.
demonstrates that states have state constitutional definitions of "dying
declarations" (for purposes of interpreting state constitutional
analogues to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment) that
may differ in important respects from the federal constitutional
definition of "dying declarations." This Article then shows that some
of the definitions of "dying declarations" contained in federal and
state hearsay exceptions exceed the federal and state constitutional
definitions of that phrase. As a result, statements admitted against
the accused in criminal cases pursuant to such exceptions may run
afoul of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and its
state analogues, even if there exists a dying declaration exception to
the Confrontation Clause.
The Existence of the 'Dying Declaration' Exception to the
Confrontation Clause
Shortly after Crawford, the Supreme Court of California issued
the first opinion directly33 addressing the question whether to
recognize a "dying declaration" exception to the Confrontation
In People v. Monterroso, the
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
California Supreme Court considered the admissibility of a dying
declaration by a liquor store clerk identifying his killer when offered
against the accused in a prosecution for, among other things, the
I.

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 131 (3d ed. 1940)). Accord Crawford v. Washington, 541

U.S. 36, 50-51 (2004).
33. Although the Supreme Court of Georgia issued an opinion addressing the issue a
few months earlier, its discussion of this issue was technically dicta (as the Court's holding
was that the accused had waived his Sixth Amendment claim), and in any event it did not
provide much in the way of reasoned analysis but instead merely cited footnote six of
Crawford. See Walton v. State, 603 S.E.2d 263, 265-66 (Ga. 2004).
34. People v. Monterroso, 101 P.3d 956 (Cal. 2004).
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murder of the clerk. 5 The accused objected, citing the Confrontation
Clause of the U.S. Constitution as well as the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Crawford. The Monterroso court, citing footnote six of
Crawford, began its analysis by noting that the U.S. Supreme Court
37
had explicitly left the issue open in Crawford.
Next, citing historical
38
evidence,
the court concluded that dying declarations were

admissible at common law in felony cases, even if the defendant was
not present at the time the statement was taken.39 Citing Crawford's
statement that the Confrontation Clause "is most naturally read as a
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting only
those exceptions established at the time of the founding," the court

concluded that the Confrontation Clause does not
40 bar the admission
of dying declarations, even if they are testimonial.

A review of the common law English precedents extant at the
time the Confrontation Clause was ratified supports the conclusion by
the Monterrosso Court and the strong suggestion by the Crawford
Court that dying declarations, even if testimonial, were admissible at
common law. First, in the 1722 trial of Hugh Reason (cited in
Monterrosso), the court held admissible the victim's dying
declaration, even though it was given under oath in the presence of
two justices of the peace and reduced to writing. 1 Second, in the 1752
trial of James Macgregor and the 1753 trial of Robert Macgregor, the
court held admissible the dying declaration of the victim even though
it was given in the presence of two Judges, who took it down in
writing.42 Third, in the 1789 trial of William Woodcock (cited in
Crawford)-ina case that has been described as providing the "classic
statement" of the dying declaration hearsay exception 3 -the court

35. See id. at 970-71. The accused was also charged with the murder of a second
individual and multiple counts of burglary, robbery, and false imprisonment. Id. at 962.
36. Id. at 971.
37. Id. at 972.
38. The evidence consisted of an early treatise on evidence, an English decision from
1722, the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier decision in Mattox, and a Missouri court decision
from 1858. See id.
39. Id.
40. Monterroso, 101 P.3d at 972 & n.5.
41. See R v. Reason, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 659, 659-60 (K.B.).
42. See 2 DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING
TRIAL FOR CRIMES 229 (1800).
43. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee's note.
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held admissible the victim's dying declaration despite the fact that it
was made under oath to a magistrate and reduced to writing."
Although Crawford did not definitively delineate the scope of
the phrase "testimonial," it stated that, "[w]hatever else the term
covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary
hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police
interrogations., 45 Because the examinations at issue in each of these
three common law cases took place under circumstances falling
within what Crawford defined as the minimum scope of the phrase
"testimonial," each of these cases stands for the proposition that
testimonial dying declarations were admissible at common law.
Indeed, the types of practices at issue in these cases, in which
"[j]ustices of the peace or other officials examined suspects and
witnesses before trial," were the very sorts of practices targeted by
the Confrontation Clause and thus the paradigmatic example of the
sort of statements that, under Crawford, are deemed testimonial in
nature.46
Most decisions issued subsequent to Monterroso have added
little in the way of analysis, typically just citing both footnote six of
Crawford as well as the Monterroso decision in support of a
conclusion that dying declarations, even if testimonial, fall within an
exception to the Confrontation Clause as construed in Crawford.47
The only exception is State v. Jones,48 issued by the Supreme Court of
Kansas shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Giles. 9
In Giles, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the scope of a
different exception to the Confrontation Clause, that for forfeiture by
wrongdoing."
Specifically, Giles examined whether a criminal
defendant forfeits his Confrontation Clause rights whenever a judge
makes a finding that a wrongful act by the accused made the witness
unavailable to testify at trial (such as by killing the potential witness),
or whether those rights are forfeited only if the judge finds that the
accused did so for the specific purpose of preventing the person from

44. R v. Woodcock, (1789) 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352-53.
45. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
46. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-47.
47. See, e.g., Gilmore, 828 N.E.2d at 302; Wallace, 836 N.E.2d at 994-96; Nesbitt, 892
N.E.2d at 310-11; Taylor, 737 N.W.2d at 794-95; Martin, 695 N.W.2d at 585-86; Harkins,
143 P.3d at 710-11; Calhoun,657 S.E.2d at 426-28; Lewis, 235 S.W.3d at 147-48.
48. State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815 (Kan. 2008).
49. Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (2008).
50. Id. at 2683-93.
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testifying as a witness." After reviewing historical evidence, the Court
concluded that the accused forfeits his Confrontation Clause rights
only if he acts with the intent to prevent the person from testifying as
a witness. 2 In order to conclude that an accused can only forfeit his
confrontation rights through intentionally impeding testimony, the
U.S. Supreme Court distinguished the situation in Giles from cases in
which common law courts admitted hearsay statements by witnesses
who had been killed, but not for the specific purpose of preventing
their testimony (as in a run-of-the-mill murder case in which the
victim's statements are admitted). 3 The U.S. Supreme Court did so
by distinguishing such cases on the ground that the statements at issue
in those cases qualified as dying declarations, 4 which they described
as the other type of statement that, even if testimonial, falls within a
"historic exception" that they have "acknowledged... were admitted
at common law even though they were unconfronted."55
In Jones, the Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that the U.S.
Supreme Court in Giles did not "definitively decide" whether dying
declarations fall within an exception to the Confrontation Clause as
construed in Crawford.6 But it viewed such a holding as implicit in
the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in Giles that it had
acknowledged dying declarations as one of two different forms of
testimonial hearsay that were admissible at common law even if
unconfronted, coupled with the Giles Court's efforts to distinguish
cases on the ground that the testimonial statements at issue in those
cases qualified as dying declarations. 7 The Jones court expressed its
"confiden[ce] that, when given the opportunity to do so, the Supreme
Court would confirm that a dying declaration may be admitted into
58
evidence, even when it is testimonial in nature and is unconfronted.
To be sure, the lower federal and state courts have not been
unanimous in concluding that dying declarations qualify as an
exception to the Confrontation Clause. Two federal trial court
opinions have held otherwise, focusing primarily on the fact that

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2684-86.
54.

Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 2682.
State v. Jones, 197 P.3d 815, 821 (Kan. 2008).
Id. at 821-22.
Id. at 822.
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dying declarations are of dubious reliability,59 a focus that Crawford

itself directly rejected in overruling Roberts.6° Moreover, of these two
decisions, one was unpublished61 and the other went on to find the

evidence at issue to nonetheless be admissible on forfeiture grounds.62
It is perhaps for some combination of these reasons that every other
court to consider the issue has found Monterroso to be more

persuasive, and has often said so explicitly.63

II. The Scope of the 'Dying Declaration' Exception to the
Confrontation Clause
Assuming that the U.S. Supreme Court will eventually state, in
explicit terms, that there exists a dying declaration exception to the
Confrontation Clause, the next question is, how will the Court define
the phrase "dying declaration" as a constitutional matter?
That the Court will develop a static constitutional definition of
the phrase "dying declaration" seems so obvious that it hardly seems
to require any support. After all, without such a definition, the
federal government and the states could simply circumvent the
Confrontation Clause by creating broadly defined hearsay exceptions
for "dying declarations" that encompass every sort of hearsay
imaginable. 64 Nonetheless, it is worth identifying some pre-Crawford

59. See United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965, n.5 (S.D. Ohio 2005);
United States v. Jordan, 2005 WL 513501, at *3-*4 (D. Colo. 2005). The Jordancourt also
rejected the historical argument for such an exception, asserting that "the dying
declaration exception was not in existence at the time the Framers designed the Bill of
Rights," but it provided no support whatsoever for that assertion. See Jordan,2005 WL at *4.
60. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-62 (2004).
61. See Jordan,2005 WL 513501.
62. See Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d at 970.
63. See, e.g., People v. Gilmore, 828 N.E.2d 293, 302 (Ill. 2005) ("We believe that the
reasoning of Monterroso represents the sensible approach and choose to follow it instead
of Jordan."); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 892 N.E.2d 299, 310-12 (Mass. 2008) (describing
Jordan as "an unpublished memorandum opinion" that "focused on whether dying
declarations ought to be excluded from confrontation clause scrutiny as a matter of policy,
rather than addressing whether such statements are excluded as a matter of preratification
common law"); State v. Calhoun, 657 S.E.2d 424, 428 (N.C. 2008) (quoting, with approval,
the Gilmore court's statement preferring the reasoning of Monterroso to that of Jordan).
64. The same problem can occur in the opposite direction: A state may narrowly
define its exceptions to the hearsay rule so as to prevent the accused from being able to
introduce evidence in his defense. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court has
held that a state will not be allowed to apply its hearsay rule so as to exclude evidence
offered by the accused where to do so interferes with the accused's constitutional right to
present witnesses in his own defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).
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as well as post-Crawford precedent that provides support for this
conclusion.
Numerous pre-Crawford U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal
court decisions addressed the scope of various exceptions to the
Confrontation Clause identified during that era. As discussed above,
under Roberts, a hearsay statement was deemed "reliable" (and thus
could overcome a Confrontation Clause objection) if it fell within a
"firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule.65 In Roberts itself, the
Supreme Court identified dying declarations, cross-examined prior
testimony, business records, and public records as examples of "firmly
rooted" exceptions to the hearsay rule.8 In subsequent decisions, the
Supreme Court identified co-conspirator statements, 67 excited
utterances,6 and statements for medical diagnosis and treatments 69 as
"firmly rooted" exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Yet Roberts did not simply allow the prosecution to avoid the
Confrontation Clause simply by showing that a statement fell within
the scope of a firmly rooted hearsay exceptions as defined by the
drafters of the hearsay exception at issue in the case. Rather, to the
extent that the drafters of a state or federal rule of evidence expanded
its scope in a way that deviated from the historical, common law
definition of the exception, courts would hold that the evidence at
issue did not fall within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.
Thus, for example, in Bourjaily v. United States,7 ° the U.S.
Supreme Court followed the Roberts approach and held that the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule was a "firmly rooted" one,
and therefore, such co-conspirator statements are admissible over a
Confrontation Clause objection without the need to make a
particularized showing of reliability.71 Yet in so holding, the Court72
felt compelled to distinguish its earlier decision in Dutton v. Evans,
in which such a showing was required.73 The Court did so by
describing Dutton as standing for the proposition that a "reliability
inquiry [is] required where [the] evidentiary rule deviates from [the]

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See supra text accompanying notes 7, 8, 9, 10.
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980).
See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 355 n.8 (1992).
See id.
Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 171 (1987).
Id. at 183.
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
Id. at 88-89.
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common-law approach."74 At issue in Dutton was Georgia's hearsay
exception for co-conspirator statements, which unlike the federal
hearsay exception, encompassed statements made during the
concealment phase of a conspiracy." Subsequently, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit considered a Confrontation Clause
challenge to a hearsay statement admitted under Georgia's hearsay
exception for co-conspirator statements and harmonized the two
decisions as follows:
The Bourjaily Court held that statements which fall within the
traditional common law co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule are presumed to be sufficiently reliable to satisfy the
trustworthiness prong of the Confrontation Clause. The Court,
however, carefully pointed out that the presumption does not
apply to those trials conducted in states that have not adopted
the common law formulation of the exception. Specifically it
noted, in dicta, that the formulation used in Georgia, which is
the one at issue in the case at bar, is sufficiently different to
mandate a76 case by case evaluation of the hearsay for indicia of
reliability.
The Eleventh Circuit went on to conclude that admission of the
statement at issue violated the Confrontation Clause, notwithstanding
the fact that the statement fell within the scope of Georgia's hearsay
exception for co-conspirator statements. 77
The Sixth Circuit has likewise held that statements admitted
under Ohio's hearsay exception for co-conspirator statements, which
also encompasses statements made during the concealment phase of a
conspiracy, do not fall within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception,
and thus are not exempt from scrutiny under the Confrontation
Clause. 8
Numerous other courts applying the Roberts framework to state
and federal versions of hearsay exceptions broader in scope than their
common law counterparts have held that evidence admitted under
such exceptions could not be deemed to fall within a "firmly rooted"
hearsay exception (at least, to the extent that admissibility of the

74. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 183.
75. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 81.
76. See Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1464 (11th Cir. 1991).
77. Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d at 1465.
78. See Anthony v. DeWitt, 295 F.3d 554, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2002); Hill v. Brigano, 199
F.3d 833, 846 (6th Cir. 1999).
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evidence at issue turned on that broader scope). Thus, even though
the U.S. Supreme Court held, in White v. Illinois, 9 that the hearsay
exception for statements for medical diagnosis and treatments was a
"firmly rooted" one,80 subsequent decisions held that evidence
admitted under state and federal versions of that hearsay exception
did not qualify as "firmly rooted" where they lack the traditional
common law requirement that the declarant have a treatment-seeking
motive81 or where they encompass statements of fault (which were not
embraced by the common law version of the exception).2
Similarly, although the hearsay exception for declarations
concerning family history or pedigree is one of the oldest commonlaw hearsay exceptions, the common-law exception encompassed only
statements made before the controversy arose; thus, statements
admitted under the versions found in the Federal and Military Rules
of Evidence, which have abolished this requirement, have been
deemed not to fall within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.83
Likewise, although dispositive documents and recitals in deeds fall
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, the broader, modern
hearsay exception for statements affecting an interest in property
(which includes, but is not limited to, dispositive documents and
recitals in deeds) represents an expansion over the common law and
has been deemed not to qualify as a "firmly rooted" hearsay
exception.' And although the hearsay exception for prior consistent
statements may qualify as a firmly rooted hearsay exception, a state
version of that exception that lacks the common law requirement that
the statement be made pre-motive would not.85
Finally, and perhaps most explicitly, when the U.S. Supreme
Court considered whether statements admitted under Virginia's
hearsay exception for statements against penal interest fell6 within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception, it wrote in Lilly v. Virginia:

79. White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
80. See id. at 355 n.8.
81. See State v. Massengill, 133 N.M. 263, 271-74 (N.M. 2002); State v. Hinnant, 351
N.C. 277, 286 (2000).
82. See Nelson v. Farrey, 874 F.2d 1222, 1234 (7th Cir. 1989) (Flaum, J., concurring).
83. See United States v. Groves, 23 M.J. 374, 376-77 (1987).
84. See United States v. Weinstock, 863 F. Supp. 1529, 1536-37 (D. Utah 1994).
85. See Jones v. Cain, 601 F. Supp. 2d 769, 805-06 (E.D. La. 2009). See also Tome v.
United States, 513 U.S. 150, 156 (1995) (describing the common law requirement and
reading it into the federal hearsay exception for prior consistent statements).
86. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
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We assume, as we must, that [the declarant's] statements were
against his penal interest as a matter of state law, but the
question whether the statements fall within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception for Confrontation Clause purposes is a
question of federal law.
In addition to pre-Crawford decisions, two post-Crawford
decisions addressing the existence of the dying declaration exception
to the Confrontation Clause have raised but not decided the question
whether there exists, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a static
definition of a dying declaration. In Commonwealth v. Nesbitt,8 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, after concluding that there
is a dying declaration exception to both the Confrontation Clause of
the U.S. Constitution and its Massachusetts counterpart, observed
that the state's modern version of the dying declaration exception was
broader than the common law version of the exception.89 Focusing on
that breadth, it then stated:
Because [the victim's] statement here qualifies under the
narrower [common law] concept of a dying declaration, we
need not address whether the dying declaration exception
implicit in the Sixth Amendment and art. 12 [of the
Massachusetts Constitution] extends to the boundaries of our
current, expanded concept of dying declarations. 9°
Similarly, in People v. Webb, the accused contended that, even
assuming that there exists a dying declaration exception to the
Confrontation Clause, it encompasses only statements falling within
the scope of the common law dying declaration exception, not
California's statutory version of the exception.91 Under the facts of
the case, the Webb court found it unnecessary to decide whether
California's statutory version of the dying declaration exception was
broader than the common law exception, and if so, whether
statements falling within the scope of the former qualified as an
exception to the Confrontation Clause.9

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 452 Mass. 236 (2008).
Id. at 249-51.
Id. at 252 n.17.
People v. Webb, 2008 WL 3906837, at *6-7 (Cal. 2008).

92. Id. at *7.
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Implicit in both the Nesbitt and Webb opinions is a recognition
that statements admitted under modern versions of the dying
declaration hearsay exception that are broader than their common
law counterpart may run afoul of the Confrontation Clause.93 This,
when coupled with the aforementioned precedents addressing the
meaning of the phrase "firmly rooted" in the Roberts era, provides
strong support for the commonsense conclusion that there exists a
static definition of the phrase "dying declaration" as a federal
constitutional matter.
Finally, a four-member dissenting opinion in the U.S. Supreme
Court's most recent Confrontation Clause decision, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts,9 lends additional support for the proposition that
there is a static definition of a dying declaration as a matter of federal
constitutional law. In Melendez-Diaz, the majority held that before
the results of a scientific test may be introduced into evidence the
defendant has the right to confront the "analyst" who performed the
test.95 The dissent, focusing on the meaning of the term "analyst,"
wrote:
One must assume that this term, though it appears nowhere in
the Confrontation Clause, nevertheless has some constitutional
substance that now must be elaborated in future cases.96
It would seem that the dissenters in Melendez-Diaz would agree
that the term "dying declaration," which appears nowhere in the text
of the Confrontation Clause (but which, like the term "analyst," must
have some meaning in order for the Confrontation Clause to be given
effect), has some "constitutional substance" that likewise will be
elaborated in future cases. Nor is there reason to believe that the
majority would disagree with the dissenters; although the majority
opinion carefully responded to and refuted virtually all of the
dissent's substantive disagreements with the majority opinion, it did
not in any way counter the dissent on this particular point.

93. See 7 Ia. Prac., Evidence § 5.804:2 n.5 (2008) ("Given the Court's strong insistence
[in Crawford] on the importance of cross-examination of out-of-court testimonial
declarations, the Court may not wish to extend the exception [for dying declarations]
beyond its limited common law parameters.").
94. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
95. See id. at 2532.
96. See id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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HI. The 'Dying Declaration' Exception to the
Confrontation Clause: A Closer Look
Once one accepts the existence of a dying declaration exception
to the Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution with a static
constitutional definition, one must then figure out which sources to
look to in order to define the phrase "dying declaration." The answer
to this question can be found scattered throughout the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in Crawford. In Crawford, Justice Scalia scrutinized
the meaning of the phrase "witnesses against" in the Confrontation
Clause and focused his attention on a single source at a single point in
time: the common law in 1791, the year in which the Sixth
Amendment was ratified.'
Yet even if one embraces Justice Scalia's originalist form of
constitutional interpretation, in which one defines constitutional
terms by looking to historical sources to decipher the original
meaning of the constitution,98 one may nonetheless have a quibble
with Justice Scalia's exclusive focus on the year 1791. After all, at
issue in Crawford was the applicability of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause not to an arm of the federal government, but
rather to the State of Washington.'
And of course, the Sixth
Amendment does not apply of its own force to the states, but rather
only by means of "incorporation" via the Fourteenth Amendment. 1°°
Because the Fourteenth Amendment was not ratified until 1868,
some critics of Crawford and the cases that have followed it have
chided Justice Scalia for focusing exclusively on 1791 and not on 1868
to the extent that what is involved is the application of the
Confrontation Clause to the states.1°1

97. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004) ("As the English authorities
above reveal, the common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's
examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth
Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations."); id. at 54 n.5 (refusing to consider
a source cited in the concurring opinion because it "was decided a half century earlier ad
cannot be taken as an accurate statement of the law in 1791"); id. at 58 n.8 ("It is
questionable whether testimonial statements would ever have been admissible on that
ground in 1791.").
98. See generally Antonin Scalia, Originalism The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN.L. REV. 849 (1989).
99. See id. at 38-42.
100. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-08 (1965).
101. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, The Sound of Silence: Holding Batterers Accountable for
Silencing Their Victims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 857, 877 (2009); Myrna Raeder, Remember the
Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford's Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse
Cases,71 BROOK. L. REV. 311, 311-12 (2005).
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The Court in general and Justice Scalia in particular have been
somewhat inconsistent in their approach to this issue. For example,
when interpreting a provision of the Fourteenth Amendment as
applied directly to the states (and not through incorporation of a
provision of the Bill of Rights), Justice Scalia has focused on 1868.1'
And in the First Amendment context, Justice Scalia has, in dissent,
focused on both 1791 and 1868 when interpreting the application of
that Amendment to the states. 103 In contrast, a concurring opinion in
that same case, penned by Justice Thomas, focused exclusively on
1791.1' Moreover, in the Sixth Amendment context, Justice Scalia
has in the past focused on both 1791 and 1868 when interpreting the
application of that Amendment to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment."' Yet in the First Amendment context, Justice Scalia
has more recently stated that "[t]he notion that incorporation empties
the incorporated provisions of0 their
original meaning has no support
6
in either reason or precedent.',
Perhaps one way sensibly to harmonize the Court's decisions is
to say that they focus on 1868 when considering the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment of its own force, but focus instead on 1791
when considering the application of an incorporated provision of the
Bill of Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment.' 7
Such a
harmonization has the virtue of giving constitutional principles a
consistent meaning without regard to whether they are invoked
against the federal government or the states, a principle that the
Supreme Court has relied upon in other constitutional contexts.1 8 Of
course, such consistency can be achieved by making either 1791 or
1868 the operative date, but it seems more logical to assume that the

102. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 611 (1990).
103. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 372-73 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
104. See id. at 358-71 (Thomas, J., concurring). See generally Mark Graber, Antebellum
Perspectiveson Free Speech, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 779, 799-800 (2002).
105. See Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 65 (2000).
106. McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 898 (2005).
107.

See Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical

Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1025 n.150 (1991).
108. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498-500 (1954) (reading "equal protection"
principles applied under the Fourteenth Amendment into the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment, and reasoning that "In view of our decision that the Constitution
prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal
Government").
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drafters of the original constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment
had the common law of 1791 in mind during the drafting process than
to assume that the drafters of the original constitution had in mind
the future common law of 1868. In any event, there continues to be
an active debate over whether 1791 or 1868 is the right focus when
interpreting provisions of the Bill of Rights as applied to the states.'09
In most cases, the choice between 1791 and 1868 may raise an
interesting theoretical question, but in practical terms is irrelevant.
Thus, for example, in Giles, Justice Scalia defined the scope of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause
while focusing his attention on 1791 but did not confine his focus to
that period because he was able to conclude that the scope of the
exception argued for by the state was "unheard of at the time of the
founding or for 200 years thereafter."' ° In the case of the dying
declaration exception, as will be demonstrated below, the choice of
1791 versus 1868 may be outcome determinative.
IV. The Common Law Dying Declaration Exception to the
Hearsay Rule
For most of American history, dying declarations have been
admissible in just one, narrow circumstance: When offered in
homicide cases in which the death of the declarant is the subject of

109. See Ronald J. Allen, Originalism and Criminal Law and Procedure, 11 CHAP. L.

REV. 277, 296 (2008); Sanford Levinson, Superb History, Dubious Constitutional and
Political Theory: Comments on Uviller and Merkel, the Militia and the Right to Arms, 12

Win. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 315, 316, 328-29 (2004); Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for
Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 659-63 (2008);
Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY

15, 42 & nn.142-43 (2003). Indeed, there is also a debate on the question whether the
correct focus of originalism is on the original intent of the drafters or the original
understanding of the ratifiers. See Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the

Supreme Court's Use of History,94 CAL. L. REV. 1745,1763 (2006); Jamal Greene, Selling
Originalism,97 GEO. L.J. 657, 663 (2009); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48

(2003). Depending on the resolution of that debate, there is a further question whether to
focus on 1791 and 1868 (the dates when the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, respectively, were ratified) or instead on 1789 and 1866 (the dates when they
were drafted and forwarded to the states for ratification). See generally Akhil Reed Amar,
Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 173 (2008)

(vacillating between a focus on 1789 and 1791); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers
Know, and When Did They Know It? FictionalOriginalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71

BROOK. L. REV. 105, 157-159 (2005).
110. Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
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Under this long-standing common law rule, dying

declarations have not been admissible in civil cases, nor have they
been admissible in any criminal case except for homicide."2
Furthermore, under the common law rule, the dying declaration of

victim A cannot be offered in a prosecution for the murder of victim
B, even if both were killed in the same affray with the accused." 3
Indeed, where homicide was among several charges in an indictment,
the accused could obtain, upon request, a limiting instruction that the
evidence be admitted only for the homicide charge and not for the
other charges."4

Implicit in the common law rule being limited to homicide cases
in which the death of the declarant was the subject of the charge was
a further requirement that the declarant must be dead,"' a
requirement explicitly stated by some common law courts.116 In
addition, the common law admitted dying declarations only if it were
shown that the declarant believed her death to be impending when
she made the statement."' Furthermore, under the common law rule,
111. See People v. Huff, 339 Ill. 328, 332 (1930); Railing v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa.
100, 103 (1885); 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§1432-1433, at pp. 278-82 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
112. See Milne v. Sanders, 228 S.W. 702, 708 (Tenn. 1921).
113. See Allsupp v. State, 72 So. 599, 601 (Ala. 1916); Holland v. State, 190 S.W. 104,
105-06 (Ark. 1916); Johnson v. State, 58 So. 540, 541 (Fla. 1912); Commonwealth v. Smith,
268 S.W. 346, 347 (Ky. 1925); State v. Fitzhugh, 2 Or. 227, 233 (1867); State v. Nist, 118 P.
920, 922 (Wash. 1911); Advisory Committee's Note to ALA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
114. See People v. Murawski, 117 N.E.2d 88, 91 (Il1.1954).
115. See 7 Ia. Prac., Evidence § 5.804:2 (2008) ("Certainly, if usable only in a homicide
prosecution, declarant was unavailable due to death."); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at §
1435, p. 284; Advisory Committee's Note to ALA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("The threshold
requirement for the dying declaration at common law was that the declarant must have
actually died.").
116. See Pulliam v. State, 6 So. 839, 840 (Ala. 1889); Kennecott Copper Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 420 P.2d 194, 197 (Ariz. 1966); Worthington v. State, 48 A. 355, 358
(Md. 1901); People v. Franklin, 245 N.W.2d 746, 748 (Mich. 1976); State v. Mills, 91 N.C.
581 (1884); Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 3 Phila. 237 (Pa. 1858); State v. Gazerro, 420
A.2d 816, 819 n.2 (R.I. 1980).
117. See, e.g., State v. Nash, 7 Clarke 347 (Iowa 1858) ("[D]ying declaration . . . can
only be given in evidence where they are made under a sense of impending death.");
Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L. 463, 464 (1857); Brown v. State, 3 George 433 (Miss. 1856);
Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587 (1850); State v. Moody, 3 N.C. 50 (1798) ("[Tlhey must be the
declarations of a dying man, of one so near his end that no hope for life remains ... but if
at the time of making the declarations he had reasonable prospects and hopes of life such
declarations ought not to be received . . . for there is room to apprehend he may be
actuated, by motives of revenge and an irritated mind, to declare what possibly may not be
true."). Courts have interpreted this requirement to mean that a statement is inadmissible
if the declarant expressed any hope of survival. See Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96,
100 (1933); Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193, 194 (1869); Marshall v. Chicago & G.E. Ry. Co.,
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only statements concerning the cause or circumstances of the
declarant's death were admissible." 8
A few jurisdictions in the United States continue to follow the
common law rule today, either because they have not codified their
evidence rules and thus continue to look to the common law to
determine the admissibility of evidence" 9 or because they have

codified the common law dying declaration exception to the hearsay
rule in their evidence codes. 2 ° However, in three significant ways,
most versions of the dying declaration exception extant in the United
States bear little resemblance to their common law predecessor.
First, most modern versions of the dying declaration exception to
the hearsay rule allow for the admission of dying declarations in other
types of cases than merely in homicide cases in which the death of the
declarant is the subject of the charge.1 2' The least significant deviation

48 Ill. 475 (1868); Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636, 639 (1869); State v. Nash, 7 Clarke 347 (Iowa
1858); Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131 (1857); Bull v. Commonwealth, 14 Gratt. 613 (Va.
1857); State v. Moody, 3 N.C. 50 (1798); Rex v. Welbourn, 1 East P.C. 358, 359-60 (1792);
Rex v. Woodcock, Leach Cr. Case 500, 502 (1789); 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 158, at p.
189 (1st ed. 1842). Although a few decisions have suggested that a "nebulous ray of hope"
or "a mere, faint, lingering hope of recovery" does not bar admission. See People v.
Hubbs, 33 N.E.2d 289, 294-95 (111.1949); State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378 (1862) (citing People
v. Anderson, 2 Wheeler's Crim. Cases 398). Moreover, it is not necessary that the person
actually say that they are going to die; this can be inferred from the circumstances, such as
where they are mortally wounded and in a condition that rendered almost immediate
death inevitable, or from the fact that doctors and other attendants around the person
thought him to be dying and so indicated to him. See Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193, 194
(1869); Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636, 639 (1869); People v. Sanchez, 24 Cal. 17, 23-25 (1864);
State v. Gillick, 7 Clarke 287 (Iowa 1858); Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 3 Phila. 237
(1858); Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L. 463, 464 (1857); State v. Scott, 12 La. Ann. 274 (1857);
McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672 (1849); McDaniel v. State, 1 Morr. St. Cas. 336 (Miss. 1847);
Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Gratt. 594 (Va. 1845); Anthony v. State, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 262,
262-63 (1838); Vass v. Commonwealth, 3 Leigh 786 (Va. 1831); Rex v. Woodcock, Leach
Cr. Case 500, 503 (1789); 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 158, at pp. 188-89 (1st ed. 1842); 5
WIGMORE, supra note 111, at § 1442, pp. 295-301.
118. See Hackett v. People, 54 Barb. 370 (N.Y. 1866); State v. Center, 35 Vt. 378
(1862); Mose v. State, 35 Ala. 421 (1860); State v. Shelton, 2 Jones (NC) 360 (N.C. 1855);
Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618 (1850); Rex. v. Mead, 107 Eng. Rep. 509, 2 B. & C. 605, 608
(1824); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at § 1434, pp. 282-84.
119. See, e.g., People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109, 112-114 & n.3 (N.Y. 1986); People v.
Cox, 172 N.E. 64, 66 (Ill. 1930).
120. See, e.g., CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 8-6(2).
121. Nonetheless, a few states continue to follow the common law rule in this regard.
See CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 8-6(2) & Commentary to CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 8-6(2)
("by demanding that 'the death of the declarant [be] the subject of the charge,' Section 8-6
(2) retains the requirement that the declarant be the victim of the homicide that serves as
the basis for the prosecution in which the statement is offered."); People v. Cox, 172 N.E.
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from the common law rule expands it slightly to allow the dying
declaration of victim A to be offered in a prosecution for the murder
of victim B when both were killed in the same affray with the
accused.122 More significant deviations allow dying declarations to be
admitted in civil cases in addition to homicide cases,123 while the most
significant deviations place no limits whatsoever on the types of cases
in which they may be admitted, thus allowing them to be admitted in
civil and criminal cases alike.124 The drafters of such expanded

64, 66 (Ill. 1930); People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109, 112-14 & n.3 (N.Y. 1986); State v.
Hodge, 655 S.W.2d 738, 742 (Mo. 1983).
122. See Commonwealth v. Key, 381 Mass. 19, 26 (1980). See also TENN. R. EVID.
804(b)(2) & 2009 Advisory Commission Comment to TENN. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("The
revised language makes admissible a dying declaration even though the declarant is not
the victim of the homicide being prosecuted. The exception would apply, for example,
where there were multiple victims but the prosecutions were severed."); Advisory
Committee's Note to ALA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (noting that, by expanding the rule to cover
all criminal cases, it deviates from the common law, which made the statements of victim
A inadmissible in the prosecution for victim B's murder).
123.

See FED. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); ARIZ. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); 6 GUAM CODE ANN. §

804(B)(2); IDAHO R. EVID. 804(B)(2); MICH. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); MINN. R. EVID.
804(B)(2) & Committee Comment to MINN. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); MISS. R. EVID. 804(B)(2);
N.H. R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Reporter's Notes to N.H. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); N. MAR. I. R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); OHIO R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Staff Notes to OHIO R. EVID. 804(B)(2); 12
OKLA STAT. ANN. § 2804(B)(2) & Evidence Subcommittee's Note to 12 OKLA STAT.
ANN. § 2804(B)(2); R.I. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); S.C. R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Notes to S.C. R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); VT. R. EVtD. 804(B)(2); WASH. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); W. VA. R. EVID.
804(B)(2); WYO. R. EVID. 804(B)(2).
124. See ALASKA R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Commentary to ALASKA R. EVID. 804(B)(2);
ARK. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 & Law Revision Commission
Comment to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-119(1); DEL. R.

EVID. 804(B)(2); Comment to DEL. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(B) &
Law Revision Council Note to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(B); HAW. R. EVID. 804(B)(2)
& Commentary to HAW. R. EvID. 804(B)(2); IND. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); IOWA R. EVID.
804(B)(2) & Official Comment to IOWA R. EVID. 804(B)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(E);
KY. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); LA. CODE EVID. ART. 804(B)(2) & Comments to LA. CODE
EVID. ART. 804(B)(2); ME. R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Advisory Committee's Note to ME. R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); MONT. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-804(2)(B); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 51.335; N.M. R. 11-804(B)(2); N.C. R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Commentary to N.C. R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); N.D. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §40.465(3)(B);

Conference Committee Commentary to OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §40.465(3)(B); PA. R. EVID.
804(B)(2) & Comment to PA. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); P.R. ST. T.32 AP. IV, R. 64(B)(2); TEX.
R. EVID. 804(B)(2); UTAH R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Advisory Committee's Note to UTAH R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); 5 V. I. CODE § 932(5); WiS. STAT. § 908.045(3) & Judicial Council
Committee's Note to WIS. STAT. § 908.045(3). Some jurisdictions, while expanding the
exception so as to admit them in all criminal cases, nonetheless continue to bar their
admission in civil cases. See ALA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) & Advisory Committee's Note to
ALA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). New Jersey's exception is also applicable only in criminal cases,
see N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(2), but in civil cases, virtually any statement made by a deceased
person is admissible under a different hearsay exception, see N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(6);
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versions of the exception reasoned that if dying declarations are
sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted when the stakes are as high as
they are in a homicide case, there is no reason to exclude them in civil
cases or in other types of criminal cases in which the stakes are
lower."

Second, although a few jurisdictions continue to impose the
requirement that the declarant actually die 126 Most modern versions
of the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule have eliminated
Rather, it suffices that the declarant be
this requirement.
"unavailable" in one of a variety of ways, including being dead 127 (one
Comment to N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). By contrast, Maryland admits them in all civil cases
but only in selected types of criminal cases. See MD. R. EVID. 5-804(b)(2) (admissible
"[iln a prosecution for an offense based upon an unlawful homicide, attempted homicide,
or assault with intent to commit a homicide"). South Dakota admits them in all civil cases
and all prosecutions for manslaughter or murder; it also allows them to be admitted in any
case when offered by the accused. See S.D. STAT. §§ 19-16-31, 23A-22-12.
125. See Commentary to ALA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("once the balance is struck in favor
of admission where the penalty is greatest, there is no reason to distinguish among classes
of cases. It is difficult to defend the argument that dying declarations are more necessary
in a homicide case than in an abortion prosecution."); Law Revision Commission
Comment to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242 ("there is no rational basis for differentiating
between civil and criminal actions or among various types of criminal actions."); Law
Revision Council Note to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(b) ("While the common law
recognized the exceptional need for the evidence in homicide cases, it is not logical to limit
it to those cases. The rationale of admissibility applies equally in civil cases and in
prosecutions for crimes other than homicide."); Commission Comments to MONT. R.
EVID. 804(b)(2) ("if statements of this sort are reliable enough for use in criminal
prosecutions, then they should also be used in civil cases where the outcome does not
involve personal freedom."); Comment to PA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("If a dying declaration
is trustworthy enough to be introduced against a defendant charged with murder, it is
trustworthy enough to be introduced against a defendant charged with attempted murder,
robbery, or rape. It is also trustworthy enough to be introduced against a party in a civil case.").
126. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-119(1) (referring to the dying declarations of
a "deceased person"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(e); 5 V.I. CODE § 932(5); People v.
Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109, 113 & n.3 (N.Y. 1986).
127. See FED. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2) & Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); ALA. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2) & Advisory Committee's Note to ALA.
R. EVID. 804(B)(2); ALASKA R. EvID. 804(A), 804(B)(2) & Commentary to ALASKA R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); ARIz. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); ARK. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); DEL.
R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); Comment to DEL. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
90.804(1), (2)(B) & Law Revision Council Note to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804(2)(B); 6
GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 804(A), 804(B)(2); HAW. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); IDAHO R.
EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); IND. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); IOWA R. EVID. 804(A),
804(B)(2) & Official Comment to IOWA R. EVID. 804(B)(2); KY. R. EVID. 804(A),
804(B)(2); LA. CODE EVID. ART. 804(A), 804(B)(2) & Comments to LA. CODE EVID.
ART. 804(B)(2); ME. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2) & Advisory Committee's Note TO ME. R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); MD. R. EVID. 5-804(A), 5-804(B)(2); MICH. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2);
MINN. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); MIss. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); MONT. R. EVID.
804(A), 804(B)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-804(1), 27-804(2)(B); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.335;
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state, California, has dispensed with any sort of showing of
unavailabilityl2).
The expansion of the definition of a dying
declaration to include declarants who survive goes hand-in-hand with
the decision to expand the types of cases in which dying declarations
are admissible: once one decides to include anything other than a
homicide case in which the declarant's death is the subject of the
charge, it is no longer the case that the declarant will necessarily be
dead. The drafters of such modern versions of the exception
reasoned that the reliability of dying declarations comes not from the
fact of death but rather the declarant's belief that he would die. 9
Although the declarant's death provided a necessity justification for
admitting dying declarations at common law, the drafters of these
modern versions of the exception reasoned that necessity likewise
exists in other common situations in which the declarant is
unavailable.13 °
Third, although most jurisdictions in the United States retain the
common law requirement that only statements that concern the cause
or circumstances of the declarant's impending death (or what he

N.H. R. EvID. 804(A), 804(B)(2) & Reporter's Notes to N.H. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); N.J. R.
EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); N.M. R. 11-804(A), 11-804(B)(2); N.C. R. EVID. 804(A),
804(B)(2) & Commentary to N.C. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); N.D. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); N.
MAR. I. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); OHIO R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); 12 OKLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2804(A), 2804(B)(2); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.465(1), 40.465(3)(B);
Conference Committee Commentary to OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §40.465(3)(B); PA. R. EVID.
804(A), 804(B)(2); P.R. ST. T.32 AP. IV, R. 64(A), 64(B)(2); R.I. R. EVID. 804(A),
804(B)(2); S.C. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2) & Notes to S.C. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); S.D. STAT.
§ 19-16-31; TEX. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); UTAH R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); VT. R.
EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2); WASH. R. EViD. 804(A), 804(B)(2); W. VA. R. EVID. 804(A),
804(B)(2); WIS. STAT. §§ 908.04, 908.045(3) & Judicial Council Committee's Note to Wis.
STAT. § 908.045(3); WYo. R. EVID. 804(A), 804(B)(2).
128. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242; Minutes of the California Law Revision
Commission (March 17-18, 2005), at 11; Eileen A. Scallen & Glen Weissenberger,
California Evidence 2009 Courtroom Manual (LexisNexis 2009). Compare id. § 1230
(specifying unavailability as a requirement for admitting statements against interest). See
also Miguel A. M6ndez, Hearsay and Its Exceptions: Conforming the Evidence Code to the
Federal Rules, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 351, 391-92 (2003) ("Under the Code, the proponent
does not have to establish the declarant's unavailability as a condition of admissibility.").
129. See Reporter's Notes to N.H. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("[T]he declarant need not be
dead, merely unavailable (his belief of impending death at the time of the statement is
sufficient)."); Comment to N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("[A] statement made by a victim
which otherwise meets all of the stipulations of the rule is no less reliable and trustworthy
because the victim has survived.").
130. See Comment to N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("The committee recognizes, moreover,
that because of medical advances, victims may survive under physical disabilities
precluding testimonial capacity.").
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eight
be his impending
believed tojurisdiction
. 3 death) are admissible,'
131
jurisdictions (New Hampshire,' Colorado,
Kansas,"' Nevada,135

New Jersey,' Puerto Rico,'3 7 Utah,13 ' and the Virgin Islands "9 ) impose

131. See FED. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); ALA. R. EvID. 804(B)(2) & Advisory Committee's
Note to ALA. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); ALASKA R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Commentary to ALASKA
R. EVID. 804(B)(2); ARIZ. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); ARK. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); CAL. EVID.
CODE § 1242; CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 8-6(2) & COMMENTARY TO CONN. CODE OF
EVID. § 8-6(2); DEL. R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Comment to DEL. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 90.804 (2)(B) & Law Revision Council Note to FLA. STAT. ANN. §
90.804(2)(B); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-6; 6 GUAM CODE ANN. § 804(B)(2); HAW. R. EVID.
804(B)(2); IDAHO R. EVID. 804(B)(2); IND. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); IOWA R. EVID. 804(B)(2)
& Official Comment to IOWA R. EVID. 804(B)(2); KY. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); LA. CODE
EVID. ART. 804(B)(2); ME. R. EVID. 804(B)(2) & Advisory Committee's Note to ME. R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); MD. R. EVID. 5-804(B)(2); MICH. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); MINN. R. EVID.
804(B)(2); MISS. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); MONT. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27804(2)(B); N.M. R. 11-804(B)(2); N.C. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); N.D. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); N.
MAR. I. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); OHIO R. EVID. 804(B)(2); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. §
2804(B)(2); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §40.465(3)(B) & Conference Committee Commentary
to OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §40.465(3)(B); PA. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); R.I. R. EVID. 804(B)(2);
S.C. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); S.D. STAT. §§ 19-16-31, 23A-22-12; TEx. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); VT.
R. EVID. 804(B)(2); WASH. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); W. VA. R. EVID. 804(B)(2); Wis. STAT. §
908.045(3) & Judicial Council Committee's Note to WIS. STAT. § 908.045(3); WYO. R.
EVID. 804(B)(2); People v. Tilley, 406 I11.
398, 403-04 (1950); People v. Becker, 215 N.Y.
126, 145 (1915).
132. See Reporter's Notes to N.H. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("In civil cases, however, the
exception is not limited to statements concerning the circumstances or cause of the
anticipated death.") Note that this statement in the Reporter's Notes is inconsistent with
the plain text of the exception itself, which limits it to statements "concerning the cause or
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death." See N.H. R. EVID.
804(b)(2).
133. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-119(1); Barbara E. Bergman and Nancy
Hollander, 7 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 94:7 (15th ed.) (noting that the Colorado rule
does not provide that "the statements are not limited to those concerning the cause or
circumstances of the impending death as does the federal rule"); Martin D. Litt, Dying
Declarations,27 COLO. LAW. 49 (1998) ("Colorado's dying declaration statute does not
condition admissibility on the subject matter of the statement. The Federal Rule, on the
other hand, limits admissibility to those dying declarations that concern the 'cause or
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be his impending death."').
134. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(e); Michael A. Barbara, 3 Kan. Law & Prac.,
Guide Kan. Evid. § 7:7 (4th ed.) ("In the federal rule, the statement must concern the
cause or circumstances of the death; not so in Kansas.").
135. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.335; Barbara E. Bergman and Nancy Hollander, 7
Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 94:30 (15th ed.) ("The Nevada statute also does not
require that the statement concern 'the cause or circumstances of what the declarant
believed to be impending death."').
136. See N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); Comment to N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) ("[T]his rule...
covers all statements made by a declarant voluntarily and in good faith while believing his
death is imminent ....The federal rule analogue, Rule 804(b)(2), limits admissible dying
declarations to statements concerning the cause or circumstances of declarant's perceived
imminent death ...").
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no such limit on the types of statements encompassed by the
exception. Rather, many of these states put in place of that limit a
requirement that the judge find that the statement was made "in good
14 The provision for the judge finding the statement was made
faith.""
"in good faith" is patterned on the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence,
which likewise did not limit the scope of the exception to statements
concerning the "cause or circumstances" of the declarant's death but
that did impose a requirement that the judge find the statements to be
made in good faith."'
If the U.S. Supreme Court uses the above-described common law
version of the dying declaration hearsay exception to define the scope
of the dying declaration exception to the Confrontation Clause, three
types of situations in which broader, modern versions of the hearsay
exception are applied would run afoul of the Confrontation Clause.
The first situation would be when the statement is offered against the
accused in a criminal case where a crime other than the homicide of
the declarant is the subject of the charge. The second situation would
be when the declarant is not dead (a situation that could arise only to
the extent one was applying the exception to crimes in which the
death of the declarant was not the subject of the charge). And the
third situation would be when the statements admitted under the
exception were not limited to the cause or circumstances of the
declarant's impending death.
All three of these situations are in play in the opening
hypothetical involving the admission into evidence of a shooting
victim's statement in criminal prosecutions in state courts in Utah for
attempted murder and bank robbery. Utah's version of the dying
declaration exception to the hearsay rule applies in all types of cases,

137. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 32A § IV, R. 64(A) (1979).
138. See UTAH R. EVID. 804(b)(2); Advisory Committee's Note to Utah R. Evid.
804(b)(2) ("not limited to declarations concerning the cause or circumstances of the
impending death...."); Barbara E. Bergman and Nancy Hollander, 7 Wharton's Criminal
Evidence § 94:46 (15th ed.) ("In addition, it does not contain the requirement that the
statement concern "the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be
impending death," as is found in the federal rule."); Ronald N. Boyce & Edward L.
Kimball, Utah Rules of Evidence 1983-Part 111, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 717, 808 (1995)
("The statement must, of course, be relevant to the litigation, but unlike the common law
and Federal Rule, use of the statement is not limited to proof of the cause or
circumstances of the believed impending death.").
139. See 5 V.I. CODE § 932(5).
140. See N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); Utah R. EVID. 804(b)(2); 5 V.I. CODE § 932(5); Piper
v. Fickett, 312 A.2d 698, 699 (N.H. 1973).
141. See UNIF. RULE OF EVID. 63(5) (1953).
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civil and criminal alike; it does not require that the declarant be dead,
merely that he be unavailable; and it is not limited to statements that
concern the cause or circumstances of the declarant's death (or what
he believed to be his death). 42' In the hypothetical, the evidence is
being offered in a non-homicide case; the declarant is alive, albeit
unavailable; and (at least the statement regarding the bank robbery)
is unrelated to the cause or circumstances of what David believed to
be his impending death. Accordingly, for three different reasons, the
evidence offered by the prosecution in the hypothetical may be
subject to exclusion on Confrontation Clause grounds.
Although the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state versions
of the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule do not contain
all three of the major deviations from the common law found in
Utah's version of the exception, nearly all of them incorporate at least
one or more of these deviations. Accordingly, under certain factual
circumstances, evidence offered under nearly any version of the dying
declaration exception to the hearsay rule extant in the United States
today may run afoul of the Confrontation Clause.
That is, so long as what I have described above is in fact the
relevant common law dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule.
Although virtually every case one reads will so describe the scope of
the common law exception, and although what I have described
above no doubt was the scope of the exception for most of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries (including in 1868, when the
fourteenth Amendment was ratified), the early common law
definition-that extant in 1791, when the Sixth Amendment was
ratified-may in fact be somewhat broader. The sections that follow
will explore the scope of the common law rule on three axes: the
"type of case" limitation, the "cause or circumstances" limitation, and
the requirement that the declarant be dead.
A. The 'Type of Case' Limitation

According to nearly all respected modern evidence treatises 43
and numerous twentieth century judicial opinions'" and other

142.

See UTAH R. EVID. 804(a), 804(b)(2).

143. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at § 1431, pp. 277-78; CHARLES T.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 260, at 557 (1954).

144. See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Wharton, 237 F. Supp. 255, 258 (D.C.N.C.
1965) ("Until about 1800 ....
[n]o distinction was made between civil and criminal
cases."); People v. Smith, 214 Cal. App. 3d 904, 911 n.4 (1989) (noting that originally, the
exception was not limited to homicide cases, but it was only through subsequent judicial
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reputable sources, 145 early common law decisions (those through
around 1800) did not, in fact, limit the admissibility of dying
declarations to homicide cases in which the death of the declarant was
the subject of the charge. Rather, so long as the declarant was dead
and believed his death to be imminent when he made the statement,
the statement could be admitted in any case, civil or criminal. Rather,
it was only in the early 1800s that common law decisions in both the
United States' 46 and England147 narrowed the exception's applicability
to homicide cases in which the death of the declarant was the subject
of the charge.
Wigmore blamed it on a misWhat caused the switch?
construction of the words of an early treatise writer that took on a life
of its own.1 48 The passage from the 1803 treatise, Edward Hyde East's
Pleas of the Crown, stated in relevant part as follows:

construction that its scope was narrowed); People v. Nieves, 492 N.E.2d 109, 113 (N.Y.
1986) ("Although originally the use of dying declarations was not limited to particular
types of cases, by the early 19th century common-law courts had begun to restrict their use
to homicide prosecutions .... "); Blair v. Rogers, 89 P.2d 928, 930 (Okla. 1939) (noting
that at early common law, dying declarations were admissible in all civil and criminal
cases); Hansel v. Commonwealth, 84 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Ky. 1935) ("At early common law,
dying declarations were admitted in all cases, civil and criminal. It was later held that they
should be received only in prosecutions for homicide, and then only where the death of
the declarant was the subject of the charge and the circumstances of the death were the
subject of the declaration."); McCredie v. Comm'l Casualty Ins. Co., 142 Or. 229, 231
(1933); Clark v. State, 211 N.W. 16 (Neb. 1926) ("At the early common law, dying
declarations were admissible in all cases, civil or criminal. Later a distinction was evolved
and such declarations were received only in homicide cases."); Thurston v. Fritz, 138 P.
625, 626 (Kan. 1914) (noting that up until about 1800, there was no distinction made
between civil and criminal cases).
145. See, e.g., Law Revision Council Note to FLA STAT. § 90.804(2)(b) ("This simple
rationale of dying declarations sufficed the courts up to the beginning of the eighteen
hundreds, and these declarations were admitted in civil and criminal cases without
distinction and seemingly without untoward results.").
146. See, e.g., Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Johns. 286 (N.Y. 1818).
147. See, e.g., Rex v. Lloyd, 132 Eng. Rep. 684, 4 C. & P. 233 (1830) (holding dying
declaration inadmissible in a robbery case, concluding that they are admissible only for
those charges where the death of the deceased person who made the declaration is the
subject of the inquiry); Rex v. Mead, 107 Eng. Rep. 509, 2 B. & C. 605 (1824) (holding
dying declaration inadmissible in perjury prosecution, concluding that they are admissible
only where the death of the deceased is the subject of the charge); Rex v. Hutchinson, 107
Eng. Rep. 510, 2 B. &. C. 608 n.a (1822) (holding dying declaration inadmissible in
prosecution for administering savin to a pregnant woman with intent to procure abortion,
reasoning that even though the declaration related to the cause of death, such statements
are admissible only when the death of the party is the subject of the inquiry).
148. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at § 1431, pp. 277-78 (citing Serjeant East, 1
Pleas of the Crown 353 (1803)). Accord Wharton, 237 F. Supp. at 258 n.4.
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Besides the usual evidence of guilt in general cases of felony,
which is elsewhere treated of, there is one kind of evidence
more peculiarto the case of homicide, which is the declaration of
the deceased after the mortal blow, as to the fact itself, and the
party by whom it was committed. Evidence of this sort is
admissible in this case on the fullest necessity; for it often
happens that there is no third person present to be an eyewitness to the fact; and the usual witness on occasion of14other
9
felonies, namely, the party injured himself, is gotten rid of.
Indeed, it was in reliance on this passage that the New York
Court of Appeals, in an 1818 decision in Wilson v. Boerem, 15'
overturned a lower court decision admitting a dying declaration in a
civil case."' The New York high court, focusing on the italicized
portions of the passage above (italics added by the court and not
contained in the treatise itself), read it to support the proposition that
such declarations were admissible in homicide cases only. 15 2 Of
course, "[a] careful reading of this statement will reveal that the
author only intended to convey the thought that such statements are
used more frequently in homicide cases because often the only witness
to the crime is the victim and he is now dead."'5 3 Nonetheless,
thereafter, high courts in other states cited Wilson for the proposition
4
that dying declarations were admissible in homicide cases only.1
Perhaps some of the confusion was created by the Wilson court's
addition of the following statement at the end of the above-quoted
passage that:
Whatever might have been the ground on which this kind of
evidence was first admitted, in the case of homicide, we find it
has long been an established rule in such cases, and I may say,
in such cases only.'

149. See EDWARD HYDE EAST, 1 A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
at 353 (1803) (emphasis added).
150. See Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Johns. 286 (N.Y. 1818).
151. See id. (overturning Wilson v. Boerum, 1816 WL 1617 (N.Y. 1816)).
152.

§ 124,

See id.

153. See MCCORMICK, supra note 143, at § 260, p. 557; C.D. Todd, Jr., Comment,
Proposed Extension of the Dying Declaration Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 2 MO. L.

REV. 201,204 (1937).
154. See Daily v. New York & N.H.R. Co., 32 Conn. 356 (1865); Marshall v. Chicago &
G.E. Ry. Co., 48 Ill. 475 (1868).
155. See Wilson, 15 Johns. 286.

SprinR 20101

DYING DECLARATIONS POST-CRAWFORD

To a reader of the New York decision, this passage would appear
to be a continuation of its quote from East's treatise, but an
examination of the treatise itself shows that this passage was not
there, and thus that the "I" refers to the author of the court decision,
and not the treatise.
Yet the confusion has resulted in other legal
writers citing this additional statement as though it were a part of the
early treatise.'
Another culprit, according to Wigmore, 58 was Judge Isaac F.
Redfield, who, after taking on the role of editing Simon Greenleaf's
treatise on evidence law made the following addition:
It is not received upon any other ground than that of necessity,
in order to prevent murder going unpunished. What is said in
the books about the situation of the declarant, he being
virtually under the most solemn sanction to speak the truth, is
far from presenting the true ground of the admission, for if that
were all that is requisite to render the declaration evidence, the
apprehension of death should have the same effect. But both
must concur, both the fact and the apprehension of being in
extremis. And, although it is not indispensible that there should
be no other evidence of the same facts, the rule is, no doubt,
based upon the presumption, that in the majority of cases there
will be no other equally satisfactory proof of the same facts.
This presumption and the consequent probability of the crime
going unpunished, is unquestionably the chief ground of this
exception in the Law of Evidence. And the great reason why it
could not be received generally, as evidence in all cases where
the facts involved should thereafter come in question.5 9
This addition was made in a footnote to the text of the treatise,
which clearly set forth the rule as it had developed in the United
States in the early 1800s:
It was at one time held, by respectable authorities, that this
general principle warranted the admission of dying declarations
in all cases, civil and criminal; but it is now well settled that they
are admissible, as such, only in cases of homicide "where the
death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the

156.
157.
471-72
158.

See EAST, supra note 149, § 124, at 353.
See George S. Ryan, Dying Declarations in Civil Actions, 10 B.U. L. REV. 470,
& n.9 (1930).
See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at §1432, p. 278.
159. See 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 156, at p. 182 n.1 (12th ed. 1866).
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circumstances' '16°of the death are the subject of the dying
declarations.

To some extent, Wigmore may be making too much of Judge
Redfield's footnote, since the main text of the treatise, which said
much the same thing, was the same as it had been since the first
edition of the treatise in 1842.16' Nonetheless, whether it was the text
or the footnote that was the driving force of persuasion, this section
from Greenleaf's treatise was likewise cited by various common law
courts in support of the proposition that dying declarations were
admissible only in homicide prosecutions in which the death of the
declarant was the subject of the charge.' 62
At the same time, a parallel modification in the early common
law rule was taking place in England. First, in 1820, the court in Doe
d. Sutton v. Ridgway,'163 rejected a dying declaration offered in a civil
ejectment action. This was followed in 1824 by Rex. v. Mead, 6 which
held inadmissible a dying declaration in a perjury prosecution and set
forth what has for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
been the common law rule:
[E]vidence of this description is only admissible where the
death of the deceased is the subject of the charge, and the
circumstances of the death the subject of the declaration.
So what support can be found in original sources for the
proposition that dying declarations were admissible in more than just
homicide cases in which the death of the declarant was the subject of
the charge at early common law? Both direct and implied support for
this proposition can be found in five decisions issued between 1752
and 1805 and a pair of treatises from the turn of the eighteenth
century.
First, in the 1752 trial of James Macgregor and in the 1753 trial of
Robert Macgregor for the abduction and forcible marrying of Jean

160. See id. at 181-82.

161. See 1 GREENLEAF,

EVIDENCE §

156, at p. 186 (1st ed. 1842).

162. See Haley v. State, 99 Ark. 356 (1911); Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193 (1869); Taylor
v. Commonwealth, 94 S.E. 795, 797 (Va. 1918); Foley v. State, 72 P. 627, 629 (Wyo. 1903);
People v. Davis, 56 N.Y. 95 (1874).
163. Sutton v. Ridgway, 4 B. & Aid. 53, 55 (1820).
164. Rex. v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 605 (1824).
165. Id. at 608.

Spring 20101

DYING DECLARATIONS POST-CRA WFORD

Key, the court admitted Ms. Key's dying declarations. 6'

David

Hume, writing his Commentaries on the Law of Scotland Respecting

Trial for Crimes in 1800, cited these cases for the proposition that
"[a]lthough, from their nature, cases of murder are the most frequent,
they are not however the only cases, in which this sort of evidence
'
may be employed."167
This was followed by a pair of civil cases in

which dying declarations were admitted into evidence. The first of
these, a 1761 decision in Wright v. Littler,16' held admissible a dying
declaration in an ejectment action that turned on whether a will was
forged or genuine.1 69 And the second case, an 1805 decision in Aveson
v. Lord Kinnaird,'7' held admissible a dying declaration in an action
brought by a husband on an insurance policy on the life of his wife
that turned on whether the wife was healthy or ill when the policy was
purchased (and in which the court cited for support an earlier
decision by Justice Heath admitting a dying declaration by an
attesting witness that he had forged a bond).'71 In his 1810 treatise,
Zephaniah Swift, citing Aveson, wrote that "[i]n civil cases, the rule of
receiving as evidence the dying declarations of a person in extremis,
has also been adopted, and on the same principle as in criminal
cases. ,,172

Less direct support for this proposition can be found in a pair of
cases from the late eighteenth century in which dying declarations
were not admitted. In the first of these, Rex v. Welbourn,73 the court
refused to admit a dying declaration in a prosecution for an illegal
174 the court
abortion, and in the second one, Rex v. Drummond,
refused to admit a dying declaration in a prosecution for robbery. In
neither case, however, did the court mention that the statements were
inadmissible because the cases were not homicide cases; rather, the
dying declaration in Welbourn was excluded because the court
concluded that the declarant did not believe her death to be imminent
when she made the statement, and in Drummond the dying

166. See HUNME, supra note 42.
167. See id.
168. Wright v. Littler, 3 Burr. 1244 (1761).
169. Id. at 1255 ("The declaration of Medlicott in his last illness, when he produced
and delivered it for the use of the plaintiff, is allowed to be competent and material evidence.").
170. Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird, 6 East 188 (1805).
171. Id. (citing Wright v. Littler to support proposition that dying declaration is admissible).
172.

See Zephaniah Swift, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 125 (1810).

173. Rex v. Welbourn, 1 East P.C. 358, 359-60 (1792).
174. Rex v. Drummond, 1 Leach 337 (1784).
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declaration was excluded because the declarant, a convicted felon,
would have been incompetent to testify had he survived.
Accordingly, these two cases are significant not so much for what they
held, but rather for what they omitted. Finally, as early as 1743,
litigants made arguments in legal proceedings for limiting the types of
cases in which dying declarations were admissible. The arguments
distinguished between civil and criminal cases, contending they were
admissible only in the latter. But no1 75one argued that they should be
limited exclusively to homicide cases.
The only early source that arguably points in the opposite
direction is a treatise from the mid-1700s that cites an unpublished
1720 decision whose holding the treatise summarized as follows: "[i]n
the case of murder, what the deceased declared after the wound
given, may be given in evidence.,, 176 Although one could read this to
stand for the proposition that dying declarations were thus only
admissible in murder cases, 177 the treatise itself does not state it in the
form of a limitation on the scope of the exception, but rather as a
description of the case in which the issue arose and what the court
held with regard to admissibility. In other words, the treatise appears
to be reporting, in digest form, that in a murder case, the court held
that the deceased's declaration made after the fatal wound was given
may be received into evidence; it is not stating that such statements
may only be received in such cases.
If the history of the dying declaration exception is as I have
described it, it has important implications for testing the
constitutionality of modern versions of the dying declaration
exception to the hearsay rule. The trajectory of the dying declaration
exception in England and the United States started out broad (in that
it could be invoked in all civil and criminal cases), narrowed by means
of common law decisions in the 1800s (perhaps more specifically
between 1806 and 1874),178 and then broadened again (primarily

175. See Annesley v. Anglesea, 17 How. St. Tr. 1140, 1161 (1743). Accord Note, Dying
Declarationsas Evidence in Civil Suits, 27 HARV. L. REV. 739, 739-40 n.6 (1914).
176. 12 Charles Viner, GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY, at 118-19.

177. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Not "the Framers' Design": How the Framing
Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis "Testimonial" Formulation

of the Scope of the OriginalConfrontation Clause, 15 J. L. & Pol'y 349, 412-14 (2007).
178. See Thurston v. Fritz, 138 P.2d 625, 626-27 (Kan. 1914); Notes of Cases, Dying
Declarations,1 AM. L. J. 366, 366-67 (1884). During this period, common law decisions
were in a state of transition between the original and the modified common law rule. For
example, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, writing in 1815, found no reason to
exclude dying declarations in civil cases, see M'Farland v. Shaw, 4 N.C. 200 (1815),
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through legislative action) in the late twentieth century. The more
recent broadening of the scope of the exception, rather than being
characterized as a deviation from the common law rule (as some
modern decisions, unaware of the early common law history, do),179

may thus better be described as "restor[ing] the dying declaration
exception to its original common law scope."' ' Indeed, it is for this
reason that the Supreme Court of Kansas, writing in 1914, overturned
the limitation on admitting dying declarations to homicide cases in
which the death of the declarant was the subject of the charge,
reasoning that to do so was consistent with the original scope of the
exception. If all of this is true, then the recent legislative deviations
from the common law, rather than presenting probable violations of
the Confrontation Clause, are consistent with the scope of the
confrontation right as it was understood at the time the Sixth
Amendment was ratified.
But how did the early nineteenth century decisions in both the
United States and England navigate their way around decisions such
as Wright and Aveson, which clearly were not homicide cases? In
Wilson, the New York high court distinguished Wright by pointing to
the fact that the court there noted that the testimony came out on the
defense's own examination of the witness, and that they made no
objection to it"-a sort of "waiver" explanation of the case. The
New York high court distinguished Aveson by saying that it stood for
the proposition that the statements by the wife regarding her ill
health were admissible as a form of cross-examination of the surgeon
who testified that, based on her statements to him during his

although it subsequently overturned the decision during that period, see Barfield v. Britt,
47 N.C. 41 (1854).
179. See State v. Satterfield, 457 S.E.2d 440, 447-48 (W. Va. 1995) ("At common law
the dying declaration exception only applied when the declarant was the murder victim.
However, the adoption of the rules of evidence has broadened the common law."); State v.
Scholl, 661 A.2d 55, 59 (R.I. 1995) ("Rule 804(b)(2), adopted in 1987, expanded the
common-law circumstances for the admissibility of a dying declaration, which had limited
the exception to criminal cases where the declarant's death had actually occurred."); FED.
R. EVID. 804(b)(2) advisory committee's note ("The exception is the familiar dying
declaration of the common law, expanded somewhat beyond its traditional narrow
limits.").
180. See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Wharton, 237 F. Supp. 255, 258 (W.D.N.C.
1965). Accord People v. Smith, 214 Cal. App. 3d 904, 911 n.4 (2d Dist. 1989) (describing
federal and state codification of the rules of evidence as having "reenlarged" the scope of
the dying declaration exception).
181. See Thurston, 138 P. at 626.
182. See Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Johns. 286 (N.Y. 1818).
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examination of her, she was in a good state of health.'83 In Ridgway,
the court distinguished Aveson itself by characterizing the
declarations admitted there as being part of the res gestae, 84 and it
distinguished the subscribing witness scenario cited in Aveson by
saying that, had the subscribing witness been alive, he could have
been impeached on cross-examination with his statements regarding
the forging of the bond, and that the other party should not be
disadvantaged from doing so because of his death.' In other words,
the Ridgway court seemed to hold that the statements were admitted
not as dying declarations, but rather either under a different
exception to the hearsay rule or for a non-hearsay purpose. Finally,
in Mead, the court distinguished the case before it from both Wright
and the part of the Aveson opinion in which it referenced an earlier
case involving a dying declaration by the attesting witness by pointing
out that in those prior cases, "the declaration amounted to a
confession by the party himself of a very heinous offence which he
had committed," while the statement offered in the instant case was
offered "for the purpose not of accusing, but of clearing himself," and
thus was self-serving in nature."8 In other words, the Mead court
seemed to effectively be holding that the statements in Wright and
Aveson were admitted not as dying declarations, but under a different
principle 187(according to some sources, as a statement against
interest).
Accordingly, a slightly different read of this history says that
these early sources provide only indirect support for the proposition
that dying declarations were admissible in all types of cases, and that,
at best, one can say that there was "no settled practice.., of
admitting such declarations outside of homicide cases."1 Why, then,
did the early treatise writers so confidently state that dying

183. See id.
184. See Sutton v. Ridgway, 4 B. & Ald. 53, 55 (1820). Accord Wooten v. Wilkins, 39
Ga. 223 (1869). At common law, the phrase "res gestae" encompassed what today is
encompassed by multiple different hearsay exceptions (those for present sense
impressions, excited utterances, statements of present bodily condition, and statements of
emotions and present mental condition), as well as certain things that were technically not
hearsay, such as verbal acts. See Polelle, supra note 25, at 294 n.24; 6 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 1768, at 257-58 (Chadbourn rev. 1976); Edmund M. Morgan, A Suggested

Classificationof UtterancesAdmissible as Res Gestae, 31 Yale L.J. 229 (1922).
185. See id.
186. See Rex. v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 605,607-08 (1824).
187. See Note, supranote 175, at 7-8, 739-40; Wooten v. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223 (1869).
188. See id. at 739-40.
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declarations were admissible in civil and criminal cases alike?
early twentieth century treatise provides a plausible explanation:

523

An

Some of the earlier text-writers... interpreted the rule as to
dying declarations as applying to civil as well as criminal cases.
This arose from the fact that the early cases where such
declarations were offered were cases involving charges of
homicide, and it was construed as a general doctrine, but the
courts, upon having the question presented to them and not
finding any actual precedent for civil cases, drew the line very
strictly and held that such declarations were receivable in
criminal cases only, and this is now the well-settled rule.18 9
Whatever uncertainty there may be regarding the scope of the
common law rule at the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified, by
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, it was quite clear
that common law courts throughout the United States had accepted
the narrower definition of the dying declaration exception to the
hearsay rule-to wit, that such statements are admissible only in
homicide cases.19° The only two published decisions to hold otherwise
in the United States were issued in 1815191 and 1816,192 and those were
overturned, respectively, in 1854193 and 1818.194 Moreover, courts in
the United States did not retreat to the early common law definition
until 1914.195 Thus, between 1854 and 1914 no "live" precedents in the
United States held that dying declarations were admissible in any
cases other than homicide cases. Accordingly, to the extent that 1868
(and not 1791) is the operative date for interpreting the scope of the
exception to the Confrontation Clause right, modern versions of the
dying declaration exception likely run afoul of the Sixth Amendment,
even if they track the early common law.
Moreover, some mid-nineteenth century courts applied an even
more narrow reading, holding that dying declarations were admissible
189.

1 BYRON K. ELLIOTT & WILLIAM F. ELLIOTT, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF

EVIDENCE 463 (1904).
190. See Wooten v. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223 (1869); Marshall v. Chi. & G.E. Ry. Co., 48 I11.
475 (1868); State v. Maitremme, 14 La. Ann. 830 (1859); Brown v. State, 3 George 433
(Miss. 1856); State v. Shelton, 2 Jones (N.C.) 360 (N.C. 1855); McDaniel v. State, 1 Morr.
St. Cas. 336 (Miss. 1847).
191. M'Farland v. Shaw, 4 N.C. 200 (1815).
192. See Wilson v. Boerem, 1816 WL 1617 (N.Y. 1816).
193. See Barfield v. Britt, 47 N.C. 41 (1854).
194. See Wilson v. Boerem, 15 Johns. 286 (N.Y. 1818).
195. See Thurston v. Fritz, 138 P.2d 625 (Kan. 1914).
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only in those homicide cases in which the death of the declarant is the
subject of the charge. 196 Yet on this latter point, the decisions were
not of one mind, and it is thus unclear whether the limitation of the
dying declaration exception to homicide cases in which the death of
the declarant was the subject of the charge has ever really been the

accepted common law rule. In other words, the common law rule is
unclear as to whether the dying declaration of victim A can be offered
in a prosecution for the murder of victim B if both were killed in the
same affray with the accused.
A number of common law courts in the United States, including
several from around the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, held that where multiple homicides result from one felonious
act, the dying declaration of one victim is admissible to prove the
homicides of the other common victims.

97

These decisions relied on

v. Baker,'98 an

Rex
English common law decision from 1837 where the
defendant was tried for the murder of John King by poison contained
in a cake that King ate. In this case, the prosecution offered into
evidence the dying declaration of his maid-servant, who was poisoned
by the same incident.9 In Baker, the court held that "as it was all one
transaction, the declarations were admissible. '' 200 Accordingly, if the
1791 definition applies, dying declarations are admissible in such
scenarios, and if the 1868 definition applies, it is at the very least an
open question.
As a practical matter, however, in most instances it may not
matter whether the broader 1791 or the narrower 1868 definition
applies. Even assuming that the 1791 definition applies (and that it is
as broad as I suggest), to the extent that the common law rule in 1791
also required that the declarant be dead and that the statement must
concern the cause or circumstances of the declarant's impending
death, there are few situations in which that would occur yet the

196. See Dixon v. State, 13 Fla. 636 (1869); Hudson v. State, 43 Tenn. 355 (1866); Daily
v. N.Y. & N.H.R. Co., 32 Conn. 356 (1865); Moses v. State, 35 Ala. 421 (1860); Walston v.
Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon. 15 (Ky. 1855); Barfield v. Britt, 2 Jones (N.C.) 41 (N.C. 1854);
Lambeth v. State, 1 Cushm. 322 (Miss. 1852); State v. Cameron, 2 Pin. 490 (Wis. 1850);
Oliver v. State, 17 Ala. 587 (1850).
197. See Commonwealth v. Key, 381 Mass. 19, 26 (1980); State v. Bohan, 15 Kan. 407
(1875); Brown v. Commonwealth, 73 Pa. 321 (1873); State v. Wilson, 23 La.Ann. 558
(1871); State v. Terrell, 12 Rich. 321 (S.C. 1859). See also 1 GREENLEAF,supra note 161,
at § 156, pp. 186-87 n.2 (citing Rex v. Baker, 2 Mood. & Rob. 53 (1837)).
198. Rex v. Baker, 2 Mood. & Rob. 53 (1837).
199. Rex v. Baker, 2 Mood. & Rob. 53 (1837).
200. See id. at 54.
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death of the declarant would not be the subject of the charge.
Nonetheless, a few such instances do exist.
One such situation, which resulted in some of the first
modifications of the common law rule by statute,2' was that in which
the dying declaration of a woman who died while having an illegal
abortion performed on her could be admitted in a prosecution for
illegal abortion brought against the individuals who performed it. At
issue in such cases was the question whether such cases were
prosecutions for homicide in which the death of the declarant was the
subject of the charge.
Early English and Canadian authorities held such evidence
inadmissible on the ground that they were not such cases. For
example, an 1822 decision in Rex v. Mead2' refused to admit the
dying declaration of the woman on whom an abortion was performed,
holding that even though the declaration at issue related to the cause
of death, such statements are admissible only when the death of the
party is the subject of the inquiry (an implicit finding that an abortion
prosecution was not such a case). 3 To the same effect was the 1860
decision by the Canadian Supreme Court in Regina v. Hind. °
U.S. courts were divided on the question of whether dying
declarations were admissible in prosecutions for illegal abortion
under the common law dying declaration exception. One of the
earliest courts in the U.S. to address this issue was the New York
Court of Appeals in People v. Davis.2 °5 In a prosecution for
performing an illegal abortion on a woman, the Davis court held that
declaration by the woman was not admissible as a dying declaration.
The Davis court reasoned that it was neither a prosecution for
homicide in any degree nor was the death of the declarant a necessary
element of the charge because the specific provision under which the
defendant was convicted required only that the woman or the fetus

201. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. L. c. 233 § 64; Cummings v. Ill. Cent. R. Co., 364 Mo. 868, 881
(1954) (citing a since repealed statute); People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 145 (1915) (citing
a since repealed statute); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at § 1432, p. 281.
202. Rex v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 608 note (a).
203. Id.
204. Regina v. Hind, 8 Cox. C.C. 300, 300-02 (1860). A 1792 English decision refused
to admit such evidence, but on the stated ground that the declarant did not believe her
death to be imminent when she made the statement. See Rex v. Welbourn, 1 East P.C. 358,
359-60 (1792). The court made no mention of the fact that it was a non-homicide case,
perhaps because at that point in time the common law had not narrowed the exception's
applicability to homicide prosecutions.
205. People v. Davis, 56 N.Y. 95 (N.Y. 1874).
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dies.2 6 The court further reasoned that under the statute, the death of
either one only increased the degree of the crime and the punishment
inflicted because the statute at issue made it a crime of a lesser degree
even if death of neither the woman nor the fetus resulted. 7 In
contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Dickinson20,
distinguished

Davis, Hutchinson and Hind, reasoning that in

Wisconsin, unlike in the jurisdictions that adjudicated those decisions,
the conduct at issue was prosecuted as manslaughter. Thus, the court
held that the prosecution was one for homicide.2 9
In Montgomery v. State

the Supreme Court of Indiana

distinguished Davis on a different ground than did the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Dickinson. Under the statute at issue in Indiana,
the state imposed a criminal penalty if an abortion was performed on
a woman and it resulted in either the death of the woman or the
miscarriage of the fetus.21 ' The Montgomery court first distinguished
Davis on the ground that, under the New York statute, it was still a
crime even absent the death of the woman or the miscarriage of the
fetus, while under the Indiana statute it can be a crime only if the
death of the woman or the miscarriage of the fetus occurred.2 2
Furthermore, the court reasoned that because the indictment charged
the death of the woman (and not the miscarriage of the fetus), the
death of the declarant was necessarily the subject of the charge, since
a conviction could not occur without proving that point.213 The court
ultimately held that whether something qualified as a homicide case
should not turn on the fact that the statute under which the accused
was charged either does not give a name to the offense or refers to it
as an offense other than "murder" or "manslaughter." According to
the Montgomery court, what matters instead is whether the elements

206. See id.
207. See id. Several subsequent decisions cited Davis with approval. See, e.g., Railing
v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. 100 (1885); State v. Harper, 35 Ohio St. 78, 79-80 (1878).
208. State v. Dickinson, 41 Wis. 299 (1877).
209. See id.
210. Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338 (1881).
211. See id.
212. See id. For like reasons, it also distinguished Regina v. Hind and State v. Harper,
both of which involved laws in which death was not an element of the offense, but rather
merely performing an abortion on a woman was the offense.
213. Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338 (1881).
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of felonious homicide-an unlawful act and death resulting from itare present.214
One U.S. decision attempted to resolve the conflict among these
cases by describing it as "more apparent than real., 21 ' This court
reasoned that reconciling this conflict turns largely on the statutory
language punishing the conduct at issue: "under one class of statutes,
the offense is punishable whether death occurs or not, and in the
other class the crime defined
is not committed unless death ensues as
2 16
operation.
the
of
a result
A second situation in which a statement by a deceased declarant
describing the cause or circumstances of their impending death could
be offered in a case in which the death of the declarant is not the
subject of the charge would be one in which the accused was on trial

for sexual assault (including statutory rape and forcible sodomy) of
the deceased, and the deceased died shortly thereafter. For example,
in Hansel v. Commissioner,"7 the accused, a man over twenty-one

years of age, was tried for "carnally knowing" a female under sixteen
years of age. 218 The young woman died shortly thereafter as a result
of giving birth to a child. Believing her death to be imminent, the
woman indicated that the accused impregnated her and,
consequently, was responsible for her pending death. 29' However,

although

the

woman's

statements

concerned

the

cause

or

circumstances of her death and were made when she believed her

death to be imminent, the court held the statement inadmissible
because her death was not the subject of the charge.2 Other courts
issued similar decisions applying the narrower version of the common
law rule.2

A third situation in which a statement by a deceased declarant
describing the cause or circumstances of their impending death could

214. See id.
215. Edwards v. State, 112 N.W. 611, 613 (Neb. 1907).
216. Id.
217. Hansel v. Comm'r, 84 S.W.2d 68 (Ky. 1935).
218. Id. at 68.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 69.
221. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 211 N.W. 16, 16 (Neb. 1926); Haley v. State, 138 S.W. 631,
631 (Ark. 1911); Johnson v. State, 50 Ala. 456 (1874). See also Advisory Committee's Note
to Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(2) ("Thus, declarations by victims in prosecutions for other crimes,
e.g. a declaration by a rape victim who dies in childbirth.., were outside the scope of the
[common law] exception"). A similar rationale was applied to civil actions brought by
parents for the seduction of their minor child. See Wooten v. Wilkins, 39 Ga. 223 (1869).

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 37:3

be offered in a case in which the death of the declarant is not the
subject of the charge would be one where the accused attempts to kill
the declarant but is unsuccessful in doing so. Shortly thereafter, the
declarant dies for unrelated reasons-e.g., he was run over by a bus
or killed by a third person."' This scenario would fall outside the
scope of the narrower 1868 version of the common law rule (since the
declarant did not die as a result of the attempted murder, and thus his
death is not the subject of the charge,223 and also because "attempted
murder" does not qualify as a homicide case224). But it would fall
within the scope of the broader, 1791 definition, since that is not
limited to homicide cases in which the death of the declarant is the
subject of the charge.
A final situation that is analogous to the abortion and rape cases
is a case where the accused is charged with arson which results in the
death of an individual. In Burton v. State,225 an Alabama appellate
court acknowledged that such declarations were not admissible in
rape cases but ruled to admit them in this case. The court drew an
analogy to abortion cases which had held that death was the subject
of the charge, reasoning that death was a component of the charge for
first-degree aggravated arson.226
B. The 'Cause or Circumstances' Limitation
In contrast to the vast legal scholarship regarding the "type of
case" limitation, few scholars have examined the roots of the "cause
or circumstances" limitation. The earliest case Wigmore cites for the
cause or circumstances limitation is an 1849 Alabama decision 227 This
stands in sharp contrast to his section dealing with the "type of case"
limitation, in which Wigmore cites English as well as early American
cases. 28 The Alabama decision in turn relies on the same case that
ushered in the revised common law rule so far as the "type of case"

222. See, e.g., State v. Moye, 765 So. 2d 1103,1104, 1106-07 (La. 2000).
223. See, e.g., State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 112, 115 & n.12 (Tenn. 2008).
224. See Paul Bergman, Teaching Evidence the "Reel" Way, 21 QLR 973, 990-91
(2003); David Crump, The Casefor Selective Abolition of the Rules of Evidence, 35 Hofstra
L. Rev. 585, 654 (2006).
225. Burton v. State, 101 So. 2d 564 (Ala. 1957).
226. Id. at 570-71 (citing Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 338; State v. Meyer, 65 N.J.L. 237).
227. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at § 1434, p. 282 n.1 (citing McLean v. State, 16
Ala. 672 (1849)).
228. Compare id. at §§ 1430-31, pp. 275-78.
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limitation is concerned, the 1824 English decision in Rex. v. Mead,2 9
where the court held inadmissible a dying declaration offered in a
perjury prosecution. The Mead holding thus established that dying
declarations are admissible only where "the circumstances of the
death [are] the subject of the dying declaration."'
But it is unclear whether there ever existed a "cause or
circumstances" limitation prior to Rex. v. Mead, or whether that
limitation was invented for the first time in that case. For example, in
the 1761 civil case of Wright v. Littler,3 the court deemed admissible
a dying declaration that was not at all related to the cause or
circumstances of the declarant's death; rather, it was related to the
validity of someone's will. 2 Additionally, in the 1784 case Rex v.
23 3 the court refused
Drummond,
to admit a dying declaration of a
convicted felon on the verge of execution. The accused's statement
indicated that he committed the crime for which he was being tried,
but the court did not reject it on the ground that the statement was
unrelated to the cause or circumstances of the declarant's death.
Instead, the court excluded this statement because the declarant, as a
convicted felon, would have been incompetent to testify had he
survived.2 34 And the court made no mention whatsoever of any such
limitation in its seminal decision of Rex v. Woodcock in 1789.235
Furthermore, in the 1805 decision of Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird, the
court cited with approval an earlier decision by Justice Heath that
admitting a dying declaration by an attesting witness that he had
forged a bond, even though the declaration had no relationship
whatsoever with the cause or circumstances of the declarant's death.236
On the other hand, in William Higson's Case, decided in 1785, one of
the judges described the dying declaration exception as applying to "a
person who conceives himself to be in a dying condition, as to the
author of the injury he has received," with the italicized language
T

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Rex. v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 605 (1824).
See id. at 608.
Wright v. Littler, 3 Burr. 1244 (1761).
See id. at 1247.
Rex v. Drummond, 1 Leach 337 (1784).
See id. at 337-38.
Rex v. Woodcock, Leach Cr. Case 500 (1789).
Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird, 6 East 188, 360 (1805).
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being a reference, and thus arguably a limitation to, statements
regarding the cause of the deceased's death.237
Despite the dearth of early common law cases referencing the
"cause or circumstances" limitation, a few early treatises appear to so
limit the scope of the exception. For example, Edward Hyde East's
1803 Pleas of the Crown (the same treatise blamed by Wigmore for
providing the genesis for the "type of case" limitation), could be read
to so limit the scope of the dying declaration exception. East's
treatise describes a dying declaration as a "declaration of the
deceased after the mortal blow, as to the fact itself, and the party by
whom it was committed., 238 Indeed, the United State Supreme Court

cited this sentence of the treatise in an 1892 decision in which it
described the scope of the hearsay exception.239 Other scholars such
as David Hume described as admissible dying declarations "with
respect to the manner and guilt of his death. '' 2' ° Greenleaf, although
quoting the language in Mead, does so in the context of discussing the
"type of case" limitation; he does not discuss separately the issue of
241
cause or circumstances in his treatise.
The earliest American common law decision referencing the
"cause or circumstances" limitation is the 1818 decision by the New
York Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Boerem,2 2 which was also the first
American decision that limited the exception to homicide cases. In
support of this proposition, the New York court relied on Edward
Hyde East's 1803 treatise.243
Certainly, William Shakespeare did not consider the "cause or
circumstances" limitation when he penned such works as Richard II
and The Life and Death of King John, both of which have been cited

as providing the early roots for the dying declaration exception to the
hearsay rule.2" In neither of those works did the dying declarations at
237. See Thomas Y. Davies, Selective Originalism: Sorting Out Which Aspects of
Giles's Forfeiture Exception to Confrontation Were or Were Not "Established at the Time

of the Founding", 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 605, 637 & nn.152-154 (2009) (quoting
William Higson's Case, Old Bailey Session Papers (April 6, 1785, # 415), at 536, 539)).
238. See EAST, supra note 149, at § 124, p. 353 (emphasis added).
239. See Mattox v. U.S., 146 U.S. 140,151 (1892).
240. See 2 HUME, supra note 42, at 227.
241. See I GREENLEAF, supra note 161, at § 156, p. 186.
242. Wilson v. Boerem. 15 Johns. 286 (N.Y. 1818).
243. See id. (citing 1 East's C.L. 353).
244. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 112, at 1438 & n.1, at p. 289 (quoting The Life and
Death of King John, Act V, sc. 4); United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Wharton, 237 F. Supp.
255, 258 n.3 (W.D.N.C. 1965) (citing The Life and Death of King John); State v. Lewis, 235
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issue refer to the cause or circumstances of the declarant's impending
death: In The Life and Death of King John, the declaration made by

Melun to Salisbury, Pembroke, and Bigot is a warning regarding their
safety and is unrelated to his death.245 And in Richard II, the dying
declaration by Gaunt to Richard II has nothing whatsoever to do with
his own death, but rather consists of advice to Richard as well as a
statement implicating Richard in the death of another person.246
Based on this precedent, the evolution of the "cause or
circumstances" limitation illustrates that it developed side-by-side
with, and thus to some extent has its fate tied to, the "type of case"
limitation and the precedents on either side of that issue. Moreover,
under most circumstances, a fact pattern that does not satisfy the
"type of case" limitation will (save for the scenarios described at the
end of the previous sub-section) likewise not satisfy the "cause or
circumstances" limitation, making the "cause or circumstances"
requirement to some extent surplusage.
This large degree of overlap notwithstanding, there is
nonetheless a rational reason why the common law limited the scope
of dying declarations to those that concern the cause or circumstances
of the declarant's impending death (or what he believed to be his
death): The limitation increases assurances that the statement was
trustworthy when made. The less related the statement is to the
immediate cause or circumstances of the declarant's death, the
greater the risk of faulty memory (since such statements undoubtedly
refer to events more remote in time) and the greater and the risk of
insincerity (in that, the less related the statement is to the cause or
circumstances of their death, the greater the possibility that there has
been time for reflection and thus, the risk of mendacity).247
S.W.3d 136, 148 n.8 (Tenn. 2007) (citing The Life and Death of King John); Ellis v. State,
558 So.2d 826, 829 & n.3 (Miss. 1990) (citing The Life and Death of King John and
describing dying declarations as being "[a]rguably of Shakespearian origin"); People v.
Smith, 263 Cal. Rptr. 155, 157 (1989) (quoting Richard II, Act II, sc. 1); State v. Mitchner,
256 N.C. 620, 630 (1962) (citing The Life and Death of King John); People v. Gezzo, 307
N.Y. 385, 393 (1954) (citing The Life and Death of King John); Sims v. State, 36 S.W. 256,
258 (Tex. 1896) (citing The Life and Death of King John).
245. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF KING JOHN, act 5, sc. 4.
Accord Wisconsin v. Jensen, Case No. 02 CF 0314, State of Wisconsin, Circuit Court,
Kenosha County, Memorandum Regarding the Dying Declaration, at 8 (April 7, 2008).
246. See William Shakespeare, Richard II, Act II, sc. 1.
247. See JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 311, at pp. 310-11 &
n.14 (5th ed. 1999); 5 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE §804.05[5][b], at p. 804-50.3 (2d.

ed. 1997 & Supp. 2009) (noting that this limitation lessens the danger of fabrication);
Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 5 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:124 (3d ed.
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Another rationale for the "cause or circumstances" limitation is
that it provides a roundabout way of assuring that the declarant
believed his death to be imminent when he made the statement (the
one common law requirement that neither the courts nor the drafters
of modern versions of the dying declaration have ever retracted). A
person on the verge of death will likely be focused exclusively on the
cause of their death. Thus, the less related the statement is to the
cause or circumstances of the person's death, the less assurance is
provided that the person believed her death to be imminent when she
made the statement. For similar reasons, the limitation may also
provide an alternative way to assure that the declarant spoke from
personal knowledge." 8 While it seems likely that she would have
personal knowledge of the cause or circumstances of her own death,
fewer natural assurances indicating that she had personal knowledge
of other matters about which she spoke exist.
As indicated above, eight jurisdictions in the United States have
eliminated the "cause or circumstances" requirement as an element of
their hearsay exceptions for dying declarations. Yet, in its stead, a
number of these jurisdictions have added a requirement that the
judge find that the declarant made the statement "in good faith." To
the extent that the root historical, common law purpose of the "cause
or circumstances" requirement was to assuage concerns regarding the
trustworthiness of a dying declaration or the personal knowledge of
the declarant, the "good faith" inquiry may suffice. That is because a
finding by the court that the declarant made the statement in "good
faith" may negate a concern that they were engaging in calculated
dishonesty, that they did not believe their death to be imminent when
they made the statement, and that they lacked personal knowledge of
the matters about which they spoke.
No case law exists that interprets the phrase "good faith" as used
in modern versions of the dying declaration exception that eliminate
the "cause or circumstances" requirement. However, there is case
law interpreting the phrase "good faith" as used in hearsay exceptions

2007) ("[I]t can be said that memory and perception are not likely to be serious risks with
dying statements relating to the cause or circumstances of death."); Moses v. State, 35 Ala.
421 (1860). Cf. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).advisory committee's note.
248. Dying declarations have historically been admissible only if the declarant had
personal knowledge of the matters about which he spoke. See, e.g., Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96, 101-02 (1933); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at § 1445, p. 304; STRONG
ET AL., supra note 247, § 313, at 311-12; 1 GREENLEAF, Evidence § 159, at 190 (1st ed. 1842).

Spring 2010]

DYING DECLARATIONS POST-CRAWFORD

extant in a few states for statements of recent perception 249 or for

statements of a deceased witness.250 Courts have interpreted the
"good faith" inquiry contained in such hearsay exceptions as setting
forth a requirement that they establish as a prerequisite to
admissibility "the declarant's incentive to accurately relate the event
or condition,"' or to be "truthful. '' 252 In light of these interpretations,
the "good faith" requirement is akin to the requirement of a finding
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness under Ohio v. Roberts
for hearsay statements that do not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. Indeed, courts applying these exceptions in criminal cases
typically have invoked the same factors to conclude that both the
"good faith" requirement of the exception and the "trustworthiness"

249. See, e.g., Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(2) ("A statement, not in response to the
instigation of a person engaged in investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which
narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition recently perceived by the declarant,
made in good faith, not in contemplation of pending or anticipated litigation in which the
declarant was interested, and while the declarant's recollection was clear."); HAW. R.
EVID. 804(b)(5) ("A statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event
or condition recently perceived by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation
of pending or anticipated litigation in which the declarant was interested, and while the
declarant's recollection was clear."); WYo. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) ("In a civil action or
proceeding, a statement, not in response to the instigation of a person engaged in
investigating, litigating, or settling a claim, which narrates, describes, or explains an event
or condition recently perceived by the declarant, made in good faith, not in contemplation
of pending or anticipated litigation in which he was interested, and while his recollection
was clear."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(d)(3) ("[I]f the declarant is unavailable as a
witness, by the declarant at a time when the matter had been recently perceived by the
declarant and while the declarant's recollection was clear and was made in good faith prior
to the commencement of the action and with no incentive to falsify or to distort.").
250. See, e.g., R.I. R. EVID. 804(c) ("A declaration of a deceased person shall not be
inadmissible in evidence as hearsay if the court finds that it was made in good faith before
the commencement of the action and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant.");
MASS. GEN. L. ANN. C. 233, s. 65 ("In any action or other civil judicial proceeding, a
declaration of a deceased person shall not be inadmissible in evidence as hearsay or as
private conversation between husband and wife, as the case may be, if the court finds that
it was made in good faith and upon the personal knowledge of the declarant."); N.H. R.
EVID. 804(b)(5) ("In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of
deceased persons, including proceedings for the probate of wills, any statement of the
deceased, whether oral or written, shall not be excluded as hearsay provided the Trial
Judge shall first find as a fact that the statement was made by decedent, and that it was
made in good faith and on decedent's personal knowledge.").
251. See State v. Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 572 (2005).
252. See Shine v. Vega, 429 Mass. 456, 469 (1999). Accord Kenneth E. Kraus, The
Recent Perception Exception to the Hearsay Rule: A Justifiable Track Record, 1985 Wis. L.
Rev. 1525, 1534-41 (1985).
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satisfied. z3

requirement of Roberts are
However, to the extent that
the Crawford Court rejected this portion of Roberts, the Supreme
Court might now view the "good faith" inquiry as a poor substitute
for the "cause or circumstances" requirement. Indeed, the Rhode
Island high court recently held that after Crawford, testimonial
statements of a deceased witness cannot be admitted under the state's
hearsay exception for statements of a deceased witness unless there is
both unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination." '
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court views the "cause or
circumstances" requirement as constitutionally insignificant (in the
sense that it merely serves as a way of buoying the "imminent death"
requirement), then its absence from some modern versions of the
dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule will raise no
Confrontation Clause concerns.
As with the "type of case" limitation, whatever uncertainty there
may be regarding the scope of the common law rule at the time the
Sixth Amendment was ratified, by the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, common law courts throughout the United
States had accepted the narrower definition of the dying declaration
exception, limiting the scope of admissible declarations to those that
refer to the "cause or circumstances" of the declarant's death.255
C. The Requirement that the Declarant be Dead

In contrast to both the "type of case" and "cause or
circumstances" limitations, the requirement that the declarant
actually be dead has been a constant requirement, albeit an often
unspoken one, from the early common law to the late twentieth
century. While this requirement was not explicit in the early common
law decisions, it can be implied from the fact that the declarant whose
dying declaration was offered into evidence was dead in every case in
which they were admitted. This was so not only in cases involving
homicide prosecutions 6 but also in non-homicide cases.257 Moreover,
253. See, e.g., State v. Scholl, 661 A.2d 55, 61 (R.I. 1995); State v. Burke, 574 A.2d
1217, 1223 (R.I. 1990). Cf Hew v. Aruda, 51 Haw. 451, 457 (1969). Indeed, some
applications of the "good faith" requirement may not have even satisfied the Roberts
standard. See Deborah M. Kupa, Erosion of the Confrontation Clause in the Ocean State:
Admitting Declarations of a Decedent Made in Good Faith, 1 Roger Williams U. L. Rev.
137, 170-76 (1996).
254. See State v. Feliciano, 901 A.2d 631, 641 (R.I. 2006).
255. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, at § 1434 n.1, pp. 282-84.
256. See Rex v. Baker, 2 Mood. & Rob. 53, 53-54 (1837); Rex v. Woodcock, Leach Cr.
Cas. 500, 500-01 (1789); Rex v. Reason, 16 How. St. Tr. 1-5, 24-31 (1722).
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even in those non-homicide cases in which the evidence was rejected,
the declarant was always dead.5 8 In other words, counsel never even
thought to offer dying declarations into evidence if the declarant was
still alive.

Although the early common law decisions often omitted an
explicit discussion of this requirement, they did typically describe the

required physical state of the declarant when he made the statement.
Some required the declarant to be in extremis,"9 which means "[n]ear
the point of death,"2 ' while others describing it as a requirement that
'
he be in articulo mortis,26 ' "[a]t the point of death."262
The terms differ
in that, "[u]nlike in articulo mortis, the phrase in extremis does not
'
always mean at the point of death."263
However, the courts were not
always so precise as to which phrase they used and would frequently
morph the two together.2 ' Given the constant requirement of the
common law that the declarant either be at or near the point of death
when the statement was made, one can infer that the common law
presumed that the person was dead at the time of trial.
So assumed was the requirement of death that courts failed to
explicitly mention it in their holdings and treatise writers felt

257. See Aveson v. Lord Kinnaird, 6 East 188 (1805); Wright v. Littler, 3 Burr. 1244,
1247 (1761); HUME, supra note 42, at 229 (discussing the 1752 trial of James Macgregor
and the 1753 trial of Robert Macgregor).
258. See Rex v. Lloyd, 4 C. & P. 233 (1830); Rex v. Mead, 2 B. & C. 605 (1824); Rex v.
Hutchinson, 2 B. & C. 608 n. (a) (1822); Rex v. Drummond, 1 Leach 337 (1784).
259. See Hudson v. State, 43 Tenn. 355 (1866); Walston v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon.
15 (Ky. 1855); Montgomery v. State, 11 Ohio 424 (1842); State v. Ferguson, 2 Hill (SC) 619
(S.C. 1835). See also State v. Tightman, 11 Ired. 513 (N.C. 1850) ("It is not necessary, that
the person should be in articulomortis, (the very act of dying;) it is sufficient if he be under
the apprehension of impending dissolution.").
260. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
261. See Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 695 (1897); State v. Blount, 124 La. 202
(1909); Brakefield v. State, 1 Sneed (TN) 215 (Tenn. 1853); Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353
(1852); Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Gratt. 594 (Va. 1845); Anthony v. State, 19 Tenn.
(Meigs) 265, 277 (1838).
262. Id.
263. Id. See also Morgan v. State, 31 Ind. 193 (1869) (noting both phrases but
suggesting that in articulo mortis is the more accurate one); Smith v. State, 28 Tenn. 9
(1848) (same). Note that some decisions to some extent mix the two phrases. See, e.g.,
People v. Wood, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 71 (N.Y. 1849) ("[Tjhey are admissible only when made
in extremity, when the party is at the point of death.").
264. See, e.g., Rex v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (1789) (describing dying
declarations as being "made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death"). See
also State v. Martin, 248 P. 176, 177 (Mont. 1926) (describing the two variations as
"flowery phrases of the courts" that simply mean that the statement was made "by a dying
person").
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comfortable asserting the same without citation to any judicial
authorities. For example, a turn-of-the-nineteenth century treatise
writer's entire treatment of the issue was, without any citations, as
follows:
§ 347 Declarant must be dead when declarations are offeredThis subdivision needs no amplification or discussion. The
declarant must be dead before the declarations are admissible
as dying declarations. If the declarant were alive he would have
to take the witness stand or his deposition would have to be
taken.265
Likewise, the 1972 edition of McCormick's Handbook of the Law
of Evidence stated without exception, that the declarant must be
deceased for a dying declaration to be admissible.266
Moreover, when the drafters of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
proposed a substantial broadening of the hearsay exception for dying
declarations in 1953 by eliminating the type of case limitation and the
cause or circumstances limitation, they maintained the requirement
267
that the declarant be "unavailable as a witness because of his death.,
Similarly, the 1974 edition of Wigmore on Evidence indicated that the
necessity for admitting dying declarations arose from the fact the
witness was dead and theorized that "[c]onceivably, there might be
still a necessity if the witness, though supposed to be dying had
recovered and had since left the jurisdiction, but this case had never
occurred, and the question never arose.,268 It then proceeded to cite
the first deviations from this common law requirement that the
declarant be dead, the then-proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and
Nevada's statutory hearsay exception for dying declarations, codified
in 1971.269
The question that thus arises is whether the difference between a
requirement that the declarant be dead and one that he is merely
unavailablehas any constitutional significance (in the special case of
California, one must ask the further question whether it is
constitutionally permissible to dispense with the unavailability

265. 1 ELLIOTr, supra note 189, at 458.
266. See EDWARD W. CLEARY ET AL., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF

EVIDENCE § 282, at 681 (2d ed. 1972).
267. UNIF. R. EVID. 63(5).
268. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, §1431, at 276 (emphasis added).
269. Id. at 276-77, n.1 (citing Proposed FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); Nev. Stat. § 51.335).
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requirement altogether where dying declarations are concerned, since
they are the only state to have done so).
In illustration of problems that could arise from a more
expansive definition of the requirement that the declarant be dead,
the drafters of Wisconsin's dying declaration hearsay exception noted
that "[w]here unavailability of the declarant is caused by death, there
are no confrontation problems" but that "with the expanded
definition of unavailability ... confrontation problems may arise. ' ' O
Indeed, to the extent that the United States Supreme Court treats the
dying declaration exception as a historical exception directly tied to
the scope as it existed at common law (whether in 1791 or 1868),
expanding the requirement that the declarant be dead to include
"unavailability" would appear constitutionally suspect.
However, I propose that there is a different way to read the rule
set forth in Crawford and to apply it in the specific context of the
dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule. Under Crawford, the
general rule is that a testimonial hearsay statement is admissible
"only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
27 This twodefendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.""
pronged rule requires both unavailability and a prior opportunity to
cross-examine. Indeed, when the Crawford court discussed the likely
exception for dying declarations, it couched it in the context of the
"prior opportunity to cross-examine" prong of the rule that it
announced.272
Under my proposed approach, one can divide the various
common law elements of the dying declaration exception to the
hearsay rule into two parts. On the one side is the common law
requirement that the declarant be dead, and on the other side are all
of the other requirements. The common law requirement that the
declarant be dead can then be viewed as going to the unavailability
requirement of Crawford, while the remaining common law
requirements can be viewed collectively as serving as a sui generis
historical substitute for the "prior opportunity to cross-examine"
requirement.
The constitutional test for "unavailability," which Crawford did
not purport to change,273 is whether the government has made "a

270. WIS. STAT. § 908.045(3) (1953), judicial council committee's note.
271. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
272. See id. at 56 & n.6.
273. See, e.g., United States v. Tirado-Tirado, 563 F.3d 117, 123 n.3 (5th Cir. 2009).
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good-faith effort to obtain [the declarant's] testimony at trial. 27 4 That
requirement is certainly satisfied if the declarant is dead"'However,
that requirement can likewise be satisfied if a declarant is physically
unavailable to testify-e.g., due to illness-with courts considering
the nature of the illness, the expected time of recovery, and the
importance of the declarant's testimony in determining whether the
good faith standard is met.276
In California v. Green,277 the U.S. Supreme Court held that not
only do death and physical inability to testify satisfy the constitutional
requirement of unavailability, but so do situations in which a witness
appears but has a failed memory, claims a privilege, or refuses to
testify.2 78 According to the Court, in such circumstances, the
government's obligation to satisfy the good faith standard is to
"produce [the witness] at trial, [swear] him as a witness, and tender[]
him for cross-examination., 279 Significantly, the Court in Green
rejected an argument that witnesses should be treated as unavailable
only if they are dead or physically unable to appear, but not if they
physically appear but do not testify. The Court reasoned that: "As
long as the state has made a good-faith effort to produce the witness,
the actual presence or
absence of the witness cannot be
28 °
constitutionallyrelevant.,

This statement in Green, coupled with the theory that the
components of the dying declaration exception should be divided
between those elements that go to the unavailability prong of
Crawford and those that go to the "prior opportunity to crossexamine" prong suggests that modern versions of the dying
declaration hearsay exception may pass constitutional muster so long
as the "good faith" standard is satisfied. However, even under this
more liberalized theory, California's dying declaration exception,
which eliminates the unavailability requirement altogether, would not
pass constitutional muster.
274. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56,74 (1980); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,725 (1968).
275. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74.
276. See United States v. Jacobs, 97 F.3d 275, 282 (8th Cir. 1996); Ecker v. Scott, 69
F.3d 69, 71-73 (5th Cir. 1995); Burns v. Clusen, 798 F.2d 931, 937 (7th Cir. 1986); Earl v.
State, 672 So. 2d 1240, 1242-43 (Miss. 1996).
277. 399 U.S. 149 (1970). Although Green antedates Crawford, both Green and Barber
v. Page (upon which Green relied on the issue of unavailability) were cited with approval
in Crawford. See Crawford,541 U.S. at 57.
278. Id. at 165-68.
279. Id. at 166-67.
280. Id. at 167, n.16 (emphasis added).
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D. Further Wrinkles: Religious Beliefs and State Constitutional Law
There are two further wrinkles to consider in determining the
admissibility of dying declarations after Crawford. The first involves
considering the religious beliefs of the declarant whose dying
declaration is offered into evidence, and the second involves the
impact that state constitutional provisions may have on the
admissibility of dying declarations.
1.

The Declarant'sReligious Beliefs
One of the oft-repeated rationales for the common law dying
declaration exception is that "no person, who is immediately going
'
into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie upon his lips."281
Given that rationale, a number of common law decisions deemed a
dying declaration inadmissible where the declarant did not believe in
the existence of a Higher Power or a "future state of rewards and
punishments."2 Indeed, a recent Wisconsin decision noted:
The basis of the rule at common law was the motivation of the
declarant, which was the awareness of the imminence and
certainty of death while burdened with unabsolved mortal sin,
which would, at death, result in immediate condemnation of the
declarant to an eternity in hell. It was the fearful consequence
of damnation which guaranteed the truth of the declarant's
statement, not the mere imminence or certainty of death.283
This decision suggests that an element of the dying declaration
exception to the Confrontation Clause is proof that the declarant
believed in a Supreme Being, and that the absence of that factor in all
modern versions of the dying declaration exception to the hearsay
rule constitutes a violation of the Confrontation Clause. However,
this implication is unlikely for several reasons.
As an initial matter, although there were oblique references to
this in some of the early cases and treatises, it is not clear that this
principle had gelled in the early common law extant at the time the
2
Sixth Amendment was ratified. For example, in Rex v. Woodcock, 8
281. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (quoting Queen v. Osman, 15 Cox
Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (Eng. N. Wales Cir. 1881)).
282. See Wright v. State, 135 So. 636, 636-37 (Ala. 1931); Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L.
463, 13 (Sup. Ct. 1857); 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 161, § 157, at p. 188.
283. Memorandum Regarding the Dying Declaration at 7, Wisconsin v. Jensen, Case
No. 02 CF 0314 (April 7, 2008).
284. 158 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (1789).
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the court raised the question of "whether the deceased herself
apprehended that she was in such a state of mortality as would
inevitably oblige her soon to answer before her Maker for the truth or
falsehood of her assertions." 5 Analogously, in his treatise on Pleas of
the Crown, East wrote that "no man could be disposed under such
circumstances to belie his conscience: none at least who had any sense
of religion.""6 However, it was not until the 1829 decision in Rex v.
Pikes that a dying declaration was deemed inadmissible on the
ground that it2 was not shown that the deceased "had any idea of a
future state. 8
Furthermore, even accepting that the common law deemed it
significant that the declarant did not believe in a Supreme Being, it is
far from clear that this was viewed as an element of the dying
declaration exception itself that raised a question about a statement's
admissibility as a dying declaration. Rather, a close analysis of the
cases reveals that their focus on the declarant's absence of such a
belief was relevant to two other issues: The declarant's competence as
a witness, and the weight to be given to the declarant's statement once
admitted into evidence.
At common law in both the United States and England and well
into the twentieth century in the United States, a person who did not
believe in a Supreme Being was deemed incompetent to testify as a
witness based on the theory that without such a belief, the oath was
meaningless (and, by extension, so was any testimony that the witness
might give)." Under this theory, if the deceased would have been
"incompetent" to testify had he survived (due to, inter alia, the
absence of religious belief), it followed that the declarant's dying
declarations likewise should not be received into evidence and was
thus inadmissible.2 9

285. Id. at 503 (emphasis added).
286. See EAST, supra note 149, at 354 (emphasis added).
287. Rex v. Pike, 172 Eng. Rep. 562, 562 (1829).
288. Id. at 599. Accord Regina v. Perkins, 173 Eng. Rep. 884, 884-85 (1840).
289. See Wright v. State, 135 So. 636, 639 (Ala. App. 1931); State v. Estabrook, 91 P.2d
838, 848 (Or. 1939); McClellan v. Owens, 74 S.W.2d 570, 576 (Mo. 1934); State v. Hood, 59
S.E. 971, 972 (W. Va. 1907). See generally Paul W. Kaufman, Disbelieving Nonbelievers:
Atheism, Competence, and Credibility in the Turn of the Century Courtroom, 15 Yale J.L.
& Human. 395,416-18 (2003).
290. See Marshall v. State, 121 So. 72 (Ala. 1929); State v. Ah Lee, 8 Or. 214, 218
(1880); Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L. 463 (1857); Lambeth v. State, 23 Miss. 322 (1852); 1
GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 157, at p. 188 (1st ed. 1842). See also Rex v. Drummond, 168
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Yet rather than being an element of the dying declaration
exception itself, this is best viewed as falling within a broader rule

that dying declarations (and hearsay generally) are inadmissible
under any circumstances in which the declarant himself would have

been incompetent to testify had he appeared and testified as an
ordinary witness. t

So construed, the Confrontation Clause should

not be construed to require that the declarant satisfy the specific
witness competency rules extant at common law. Rather, the
declarant's dying declaration should be admissible so long as he

would be competent to testify as an ordinary witness under the thenexisting competency rules.2 9

Over time, states eliminated lack of religious belief as a basis for
deeming a witness incompetent.' 93 As a result, some courts have
deemed the absence of such beliefs irrelevant with regards to the
admissibility of dying declarations. 94 While this is true so far as
questions regarding the competency of the declarant (and thus the

admissibility of his dying declaration) are concerned, there is one
other reason why the absence of religious belief is nonetheless a
relevant

consideration.

A

theoretical justification

for

the

trustworthiness of dying declarations at common law was that a
person would not want to meet his Maker with a lie on his lips for
fear of supernatural punishment in the afterlife. To the extent that a

Eng. Rep. 271 (1784) (holding dying declaration not admissible because it was made by
convicted felon, who would have been incompetent to testify had he been alive).
291. See Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697 (1897).
292. In a similar vein, common law cases and early treatises hold that dying
declarations are admissible only if the dying declarant had personal knowledge of the
matters about which he spoke. See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 101-02
(1933); 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, § 1445, at 304; STRONG ET AL., supra note 247, § 313,
at 311-12; 1 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 159, at p. 190 (1st ed. 1842). One reading of such
authorities is that personal knowledge is thus another element of the common law dying
declaration exception and that its absence creates a Confrontation Clause problem. See
Taylor v. Michigan, 737 N.W.2d 790 (Mich. 2007), Petition for Writ of Certiorari (2008).
But an alternative reading is that the requirement of personal knowledge falls more
generally under the broad rule that dying declarations are inadmissible under any
circumstance that would make the declarant incompetent to testify as an ordinary witness.
See Carver, 164 U.S. at 697. So construed, the Confrontation Clause would not be
construed to require that the declarant satisfy the specific witness competency rules extant
at common law. Rather, the declarant's dying declaration would be admissible so long as
he would be competent to testify as an ordinary witness under the then-existing
competency rules, including the requirement that the declarant testify from personal knowledge.
293. See FED. R. EVID. 601 advisory committee's note.
294. See State v. Williams, 209 P. 1068 (Idaho 1922); Ah Lee, 8 Or. 214 at 218.
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belief in such an afterlife was lacking, however, so too was the
trustworthinessof the statements.9 As Wigmore puts it,
If in the jurisdiction a witness is no longer affected by the
common-law rule requiring an oath and the capacity to take an
oath, i.e., the possession of a specific theological belief, the
declarant's belief is immaterial in determining his oath capacity.
But even where this common-law rule is abolished, his belief
may still become material with reference to the admissibility of
this specific class of declaration. 96
For this reason, numerous common law decisions throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries from jurisdictions that have
abrogated the common law ground of incompetency for lack of
religious belief have nonetheless deemed such a lack of belief to be
pertinent to the specific issue of admitting the non-believer's dying
declaration. 7 Indeed, even as late as 1982, one can find decisions
295. See Goodall v. State, 1 Or. 333, 335 (1861) ("But when the deceased was a
disbeliever, and, consequently, under no apprehension of future punishment for his
falsehood, it is reasonable to believe that, however much he may be impressed with the
fear of immediate and certain death, still he would not be under such strong influences to
make a true statement of the facts as one impressed with the belief of future
accountability.").
296. See 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, § 1443, at 303. Accord ELLIOTF, supra note 189,
§ 350, at 462-63.
297. See McClellan v. Owens, 74 S.W.2d 570, 577-78 (Mo. 1934); Marshall v. State, 121
So. 72, 84 (Ala. 1929) ("In all the following cases and text-books, it was held that, when
there is such religious unbelief as, at common law, would disqualify a witness, evidence of
such unbelief is admissible to discredit a dying declaration, even where there is a statute or
constitutional provision which abrogates the common law in this respect."); People v. Lim
Foon, 155 P. 477, 477 (Cal. App. 3d 1915) ("Undoubtedly, if it were made to appear that
the declarant was wholly obtuse to religious convictions, and that he entertained complete
disbelief in a future spiritual existence or had no regard whatsoever for the theory of
rewards and punishments in the hereafter, his statement in extremis would not be
supported by those considerations which may naturally be supposed to exercise an
overruling influence upon the minds of men in such circumstances, and in such case, even
if, nevertheless, the competency of the declaration as evidence would not be destroyed,
the credibility of it would be greatly impaired, and when given under such circumstances it
should never be submitted to a jury unaccompanied by an explicit admonition by the court
that it should be viewed with great caution."); State v. Blount, 50 So. 12, 14 (La.1909)
("And where by statute a want of religious belief is no longer a disqualification of
witnesses, although the irreligious character of the declarant cannot be relied on to
exclude his dying declaration, it may be shown that he did not believe in a future state of
rewards and punishments, for the purpose of impeaching his credibility; for such a person,
although in articulo mortis, might not be solemnly impressed with the necessity of
speaking the truth."); Gambrell v. State, 46 So. 138, 138 (Miss. 1908) (citing Hill v. State,
64 Miss. 431 (1887)) (holding that, even though not admissible for purpose of rendering
dying declaration incompetent, it is admissible as affecting the weight to be given it by the
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indicating the pertinence of the declarant's belief in "a future state of
rewards or punishment" so far as dying declarations are concerned.298
However, in taking this factor into account, these common law
courts have not treated it as an element of the dying declaration
exception to the hearsay rule that is critical to its admissibility.
Rather, these decisions deemed the dying declarations to be
admissible but held that they could be impeached by allowing the
opposing party to introduce evidence of the person's lack of religious

belief, and left it to the jury to assess the weight and credibility of the
statement.2 This distinction between admissibility and weight is
sensible. Although the religious ground is one basis for deeming such
statements trustworthy, there exist psychological and physiological
justifications for the trustworthiness of such declarations as well.3"
Accordingly, the declarant's religious beliefs do not constitute an
element of the common law exception, although they might be

relevant to the weight conferred on the dying declaration. Thus,
modern versions of the exception that do not include this factor
should not raise any concerns under the Confrontation Clause.3 "'

jury); People v. Chin Mook Sow, 51 Cal. 597 (1877) (distinguishing between using lack of
religious belief on the issue of competency versus using it to affect the credibility of a dying
declaration).
298. See State v. Quintana, 644 P.2d 531, 534 (N.M. 1982).
299. See Marshall, 121 So. at 75.; McClendon v. State, 251 P. 515 (Okla. 1926); State v.
Rozell, 225 S.W. 931 (Mo. 1920); Lim Foon, 155 P. at 481; Blount, 50 So. at 14.; Gambrell,
46 So. at 138.; Carver v. United States, 164 U.S. 694, 697-98 (1897) (holding that evidence
that the deceased "did not believe in a future state of rewards or punishment" admissible
to discredit their dying declaration); State v. Elliott, 45 Iowa 486 (1877). See generally
Kaufman, supranote 289, at 412-15.
300. See generally 5 WIGMORE, supra note 111, § 1443, at 302.
301. If there is a problem with admitting such evidence, it is not, in my view, a First
Amendment Establishment Clause problem. After all, extant in virtually every state today
is a testimonial privilege for communications with clergy, which is unavailable to those
who don't in any way subscribe to or participate in organized religion, yet such a privilege
has been deemed not to present an Establishment Clause problem. See Madison v. Riter,
355 F.3d 310, 320 (4th Cir. 2003). See generally Ronald J. Colombo, Forgive Us Our Sins:
The Inadequacies of the Clergy Penitent Privilege, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 225 (1998); Chad
Horner, Beyond the Confines of the Confessional: The Priest-PenitentPrivilegein a Diverse
Society, 45 Drake L. Rev. 697, 721-28 (1997). But see In re Lifschutz, 467 P.2d 557, 560
(Cal. 1970) (characterizing this as a "potentially difficult constitutional question"); Stoyles,
The Dilemma of the Constitutionality of the Priest-PenitentPrivilege-The Application of
the Religion Clauses, 29 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 27, 39-56 (1967) (describing the tension between
the Free Exercise Clause's requirement that such a privilege be recognized and the
Establishment Clause). Rather, admitting such evidence may run afoul of Federal Rule
610 (and its state court analogues), which provides that "[e]vidence of the beliefs or
opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

2.

[Vol. 37:3

The Impact of State Constitutions

Most states' constitutions include analogous provisions to the
Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. Although
some state courts have held that these provisions are identical in
scope to the federal provision,0 many others give these provisions

independent meaning.

°3

Accordingly, even if admitting a dying

declaration passes muster under the Confrontation Clause of the
United States Constitution, admitting the dying declaration may
nonetheless run afoul of its counterpart in the relevant state
constitution.
Additionally, just as precedent pertaining to the Confrontation
Clause of the United States Constitution looks to the common law
extant at the time of its adoption to determine its scope, so too does
precedent interpreting the scope of state versions of the same look to
the common law extant at the time the state constitutional provisions
were adopted.3°4 Moreover, most states adopted constitutions well
after 1791 and throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Accordingly, even if one were to assume that the scope of the
dying declaration exception to the Confrontation Clause as applied to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment is to be determined by
reference to the common law as it stood in 1791 (as opposed to 1868),
and even if one accepts the broader interpretation of what the
common law rule was in 1791, modern versions of the dying
declaration exception extant in states today that fall within the scope
of the common law rule as it stood in 1791 may nonetheless be
deemed unconstitutional. This is because they would also be subject
to scrutiny under independent state constitutional provisions that
were adopted and are interpreted by the common law as it stood in

that by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced."

See

STRONG ET AL., supra note 247, at § 309, at 305-06, n.2.

302. See, e.g., State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 641-42 (N.J. 2007); Wilson v. City of Pine
Bluff, 643 S.W.2d 569, 569-70 (Ark. 1982).
303. See, e.g., State v. Fields, 168 P.3d 955, 968 (Haw. 2007) (continuing to apply
Roberts analysis to non-testimonial hearsay as a matter of state constitutional law,
notwithstanding its conclusion that such analysis is no longer required by the federal
constitution); People v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 401, 410-13 (Cal. 1980).
304. See, e.g., Gannon v. State, 704 A.2d 272, 278 (Del. 1998) (identifying the common
law in 1792, the year when the Delaware Constitution was adopted, as the relevant body
of law for determining the scope of Delaware's analogue to the Confrontation Clause);
Commonwealth v. Bergstrom, 524 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Mass. 1988) ("[W]hen a witness is
unavailable, the standard of admissibility is met when the admitted evidence is recognized
as being an 'acknowledged exception[ ] to the face to face rule of evidence' at the time of
the State Constitution'sadoption.") (emphasis added).
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the scope of the
common law exception had narrowed.
Further wrinkles will likely arise in challenging modern versions
of the dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule on state
constitutional grounds. First, states might decide not to recognize any
dying declaration exception to their constitutional provisions
(although, as indicated in the introduction, many states already did so
in the nineteenth century). Moreover, for states that subsequently
adopted new constitutions, they will have to determine whether the
relevant date for determining the scope of the exception is the
common law as it stood at the time of the original constitution or the
newly adopted one.
Conclusion
Assuming that the Supreme Court confirms that there exists a
dying declaration exception to the Confrontation Clause, there are at
least three additional constitutional questions for the Court to
resolve. First, whether the exception can be invoked only in homicide
cases (and, more narrowly, those in which the death of the declarant
is the subject of the charge), or whether it can be invoked in other
types of criminal cases as well. Second, whether it only encompasses
statements concerning the cause or circumstances of the declarant's
impending death (or what he believed to be his impending death), or
whether it can be invoked to admit unrelated statements. Third,
whether the declarant must die, or whether it suffices that he is
merely unavailable.
The answers to each of these constitutional questions hinges
upon how the Supreme Court resolves three additional issues:
choosing among competing versions of history; choosing among
competing points in history that matter (1791 versus 1868); and
deciding whether to characterize the historical elements of the dying
declaration exception in narrow or broad terms for Confrontation
Clause purposes.
So far as the first two constitutional questions regarding the
"type of case" and "cause or circumstances" limitations are
concerned, the answer will differ depending on how the court resolves
competing characterizations of the common law elements of the dying
declaration exception at specific points in history, as well as its
resolution as to which point in history is relevant. If the relevant date
is 1868, resolution will result in a narrow exception to the
Confrontation Clause for dying declarations. At that point in history,
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the common law uniformly limited the admissibility of dying
declarations to homicide cases and admitted only those concerning
the cause or circumstances of the declarant's impending death.
If, on the other hand, the relevant date is 1791, one encounters
competing characterizations of the elements of common law rule.
Under one reading of the cases, neither a "type of case" limitation
nor a "cause or circumstances" limitation was extant at the time the
Sixth Amendment was adopted. However, one could attempt to
characterize the cases as implicitly admitting such declarations only in
homicide cases in which the death of the declarant was the subject of
the charge, and the circumstances of her death the subject of the
declaration. If interpreted through this lens, the constitutional
question would be answered in the same way regardless of whether
the 1791 or the 1868 date is used.
Accordingly, in this situation, a focus on 1791 versus 1868 may be
outcome determinative, and thus, one which the Supreme Court will
have to resolve. To the extent that one is dealing with the federal
government, 1791 would remain the correct focus. However, it
remains an open question whether 1791 or 1868 is the correct focus to
the extent we are applying the Sixth Amendment to the states via the

Fourteenth Amendment. If 1868 is the correct focus so far as states
are concerned, the scope of the dying declaration exception to the
Confrontation Clause will differ depending upon whether it is
invoked in federal or state proceedings.
Ironically, if the Court rules that the broader 1791 definition
applies in federal proceedings and the narrower 1868 definition

applies in state proceedings, the effect would be to create room for
the scope of the federal dying declarations exception to expand while
many states would concurrently be forced to contract the scope of
their dying declarations exceptions. The reason for this drastically
different outcome is that the federal dying declarations exception
largely tracks the narrower common law rule as it stood in 1868: In

criminal cases, it can be invoked only in homicide cases, and it
contains the "cause or circumstances" limitation.0 In contrast, many
state versions of the dying declaration exception are much closer in
scope to the common law rule as it stood in 1791 because they

eliminated either the "type of case" or "cause or circumstances"
limitations.

305. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2). Although dying declarations are admissible in civil
cases as well under the federal rule, the Confrontation Clause isinapplicable in such proceedings.
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Moreover, the answers to all three constitutional questions
depends on whether one characterizes the historical elements of the
dying declaration exception in narrow or broad terms. In considering
this point, I assume that the common law (whichever date is chosen)
required that the declarant be dead; that the declarant believed his
death to be imminent when he made the statement; that the
statement concern the cause or circumstances of the declarant's
death; and that the statements were admissible only in homicide cases
(and perhaps only those in which the death of the declarant was the
subject of the charge). If one narrowly characterizes the scope of the
dying declaration exception to the Confrontation Clause to require
these precise elements, then a hearsay statement admitted under any
modern version of the dying declaration exception that deviates from
these common law requirements is constitutionally infirm as applied
in cases in which any of the common law elements are lacking.
But I would suggest that there is an alternative, less "formalistic
and wooden"3 way of defining the scope of the dying declaration
exception to the Confrontation Clause that, while remaining true to
the common law history of the exception and the spirit of Crawford
and its progeny, does not cast quite so dark a cloud of constitutional
doubt over the versions of the dying declaration exceptions to the
hearsay rule extant throughout the United States today.
Under this alternative approach, one can use Crawford's twin
requirements for admitting testimonial hearsay of unavailability and a
prior opportunity for cross-examination as a starting point. One can
then view the common law requirement that the declarant be dead as
going to the unavailability requirement and, consistent with
California v. Green, can conclude that any form of unavailability,
including death, will satisfy that requirement so long as the good faith
standard is satisfied. Under this view, the other elements of the
common law exception form the historical exception to the prior
opportunity for cross-examination requirement.
One can then posit that of the remaining common law elements,
the key element is the declarant's belief that death be imminent.
After all, that element, which every modern version of the dying
declaration hearsay exception contains,' is the element consistently
306. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527,2544 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (2009).
307. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); ALA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); ALASKA R. EVID.
804(b)(2); ARIZ. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); ARK. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1242;
CONN. CODE OF EVID. § 8-6(2); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-119(1); DEL. R. EVID.

804(b)(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804 (2)(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-6; 6 GUAM CODE
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cited both in early English common law decisions,' subsequent
common law decisions in the United States,c 9 and respected
treatises.3 as giving dying declarations an equivalency to testimony

given under oath, and thus provides the "historical basis" for
satisfying the prior opportunity for cross-examination requirement.
Under this view, the cause or circumstances limitation could be
viewed as one way of providing assurance that the constitutionally
ANN. § 804(b)(2); HAW. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); IDAHO R. EVID. 804(b)(2); IND. R. EvID.
804(b)(2); IOWA R. EVID. 804(b)(2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(e); KY. R. EVID.
804(b)(2); LA. CODE EVID. ART. 804(B)(2); ME. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); MD. R. EVID. 5804(b)(2); MICH. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); MINN. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); MISS. R. EVID. 804(b)(2);
MONT. R. EvID. 804(b)(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-804(2)(b); NEV. REV. STAT. § 51.335;
N.H. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); N.J. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); N.M. R. 11-804(B)(2); N.C. R. EVID.
804(b)(2); N.D. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); N. MAR. I. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); OHIO R. EVID.
804(b)(2); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2804(B)(2); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §40.465(3)(b); PA.
R. EVID. 804(b)(2); P.R. ST. T.32 AP. IV, R. 64(A); R.I. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); S.C. R. EVID.
804(b)(2); S.D. STAT. §§ 19-16-31, 23A-22-12; TEx. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); UTAH R. EVID.
804(b)(2); VT. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); 5 V.1. CODE § 932(5); WASH. R. EVID. 804(b)(2);
W.VA. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); WIS. STAT. § 908.045(3); WYO. R. EVID. 804(b)(2); People v.
Tilley, 94 N.E.2d 328, 331-332 (Ill 1950); People v. Becker, 109 N.E. 127, 133 (N.Y. 1915).
308. See Rex v. Woodcock, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789) ("Now the general principle
on which this species of evidence is admitted is, that they are declarations made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death, and when every hope of this world is
gone: when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most
powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn, and so awful, is
considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a
positive oath administered in a Court of Justice."); Rex v. Drummond, 168 Eng. Rep. 271,
271 (1784) ("The principle upon which this species of evidence is received is, that the
mind, impressed with the awful idea of approaching dissolution, acts under a sanction
equally powerful with that which it is presumed to feel by a solemn appeal to God upon an
oath. The declarations therefore of a person dying under such circumstances, are
considered as equivalent to the evidence of the living witness upon oath.").
309. See Thurston v. Fritz, 138 P. 625, 626 (Kan. 1914) ("The theory on which dying
declarations have been admitted is that the realization of impending death operates on the
mind and conscience of the declarant with strength equal to that of an ordinary oath
administered in a judicial proceeding."); Donnelly v. State, 26 N.J.L. 463, 21 (1857)
("Dying declarations derive their sanction, as testimony, from the fact that they are made
under the apprehension of approaching dissolution, in the view and expectation of speedy
death; the situation of the party, under such solemn circumstances, creating a sanction
equally impressive with that of an oath administered in a court of justice."); State v.
Moody, 3 N.C. 31, 1 (1798) ("[Tlhey must be the declarations of a dying man, of one so
near his end that no hope of life remains, for then the solemnity of the occasion is a good
security for his speaking the truth, as much so as if he were under the obligation of an oath.").
310. See 1 GREENLEAF, supra note 161, §156, at p. 186; EAST, supra note149, § 124,
353-54 ("[I]t must appear that the deceased at the time of making such declarations was
conscious of his danger; such consciousness being considered as equivalent to the sanction
of an oath."); ELLIOTT, supra note 189, §334, at 445 ("[T]he mind, impressed with the
awful idea of approaching dissolution, acts under a sanction equally powerful with that
which it is presumed to feel, by a solemn appeal to God on oath."); 5 WIGMORE, supra
note 111, § 1438, at 289-91 (collecting cases).
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significant element (belief in imminent death) is satisfied, and thus
modern substitutes, such as a finding that the declarant made the
statement in "good faith" (a distinct "good faith" inquiry from the
one required when dealing with unavailability) may serve as a valid
substitute inquiry. Alternatively, both the "cause or circumstances"
and the "type of case" limitations could be viewed as surplusage
lacking constitutional significance.
The Supreme Court's recent reference to the "historic
exception" for dying declarations in Giles v. California is consistent
with the view that neither the "cause or circumstances" nor the "type
of case" limitations are part of the constitutional definition of a dying
declaration. In Giles, the Court did not use a definition that referred
to either homicide cases or the cause or circumstances of the
declarant's impending death. Rather, the Court described dying
declarations as "declarations made by a speaker who was both on the
brink of death and aware that he was dying., 311 Indeed, a recent
decision by the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that the evidence
at issue passed constitutional muster because it fell within the scope
of the specific definition set forth in Giles-namely that the speaker
was both on the brink of death and aware that he was dying. 12
The dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule is certainly
not without its critics, who might welcome a "formalistic and
wooden" approach to the Confrontation Clause question as an
opportunity to narrow the scope of the dying declaration exception
when invoked against the accused in a criminal case. Such critics
question the reliability of dying declarations on two fronts. First, they
dispute the premise that those on the verge of death necessarily lose
any motivation to be untruthful, noting that the desire for revenge
against one's enemies is a powerful force that can overcome any
psychological motivation to speak truthfully. 13 Second, they point out
that the physical trauma experienced by those on the verge of death
may negatively impact their powers of perception, memory,
comprehension, and clarity of communication.3 14 Despite the fact that
Crawford sounded the death knell for reliability as the touchstone for
admissibility of hearsay evidence when challenged on Confrontation
Clause grounds, such concerns about the reliability of dying
311. See Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678, 2682 (2008).
312. See State v. Jones, 315 P. 3d 815, 821-22 (Kan. 2008).
313. See Polelle, supra note 25, at 301-02; Bryan A. Liang, Shortcuts to "Truth": The
Legal Mythology of Dying Declarations,35 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 229, 238 (1998).
314. See Polelle, supra note 25, at 302-03; Liang, supranote 313, at 236-43.
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declarations may impact the Court's decision of whether to broadly or
narrowly construe the scope of the dying declaration exception to the
Confrontation Clause.
Even if the Court were to favor the narrowest interpretation of
each of the constitutional inquiries, that would not fully invalidate
broad, modern versions of the dying declaration exception to the
hearsay rule for several reasons. First, the Confrontation Clause is
inapplicable when offered under such modern exceptions in a civil
case. Second, the Confrontation Clause would not pose a bar to
admissibility if the accused offered a dying declaration on his own
behalf and against the government to exonerate himself. Third, the
Confrontation Clause would not present a bar to admissibility if the
declarant were to appear at trial and be subjected to crossexamination concerning the statement. Fourth, the Confrontation
Clause would pose no bar to admissibility if, at the time the dying
declaration were given, the accused did have an opportunity to crossexamine the dying declarant. Finally, if the evidence were offered for
some reason other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the
Confrontation Clause would pose no bar to admissibility.
Moreover, despite how the United States Supreme Court
resolves these questions, a parallel set of questions will present
themselves in state courts interpreting analogous state constitutional
provisions across the country. Such courts will have to determine
first, whether their analogues to the Confrontation Clause of the
United States Constitution are to be interpreted independently. If so,
the state courts will have to determine whether or not to recognize a
dying declaration exception to their constitutional provisions and the
scope of the exception if they choose to recognize it. If the scope is to
be determined by reference to the common law at the time the state
constitutional provision was adopted, they will have to determine
what the scope of the common law was at that point in time. States
that adopted new constitutions will have to determine whether the
relevant date for determining the scope of the exception is the
common law as it stood at the time of the original constitution or the
newly adopted one.
In sum, when the admission of a dying declaration is challenged
on Confrontation Clause grounds, courts cannot simply rely on
footnote six of Crawford to hold that dying declarations fall within a
historical exception to the Confrontation Clause.
Rather, to
determine the scope of the dying declaration exception to the
Confrontation Clause, courts must engage in a multi-faceted inquiry
that requires them first to determine which point in the history of the
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common law to use to determine the scope of the historical exception
and next to determine what the scope of the exception was at that
time. Furthermore, the courts will be required to determine which
elements of the historical exception are constitutionally significant.

From there, courts can determine the constitutionality of admitting
the dying declaration by determining whether it satisfies the
constitutionally significant elements of the common law exception at
the requisite point in time. Finally, to the extent that one is dealing
with evidence offered in state court proceedings, courts will have to
repeat the above inquiry for the analogous provisions found in state
constitutions.

